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Executive Summary 
 
 
I 
 
Security sector reform addresses two main 
challenges: (1) assisting institutions 
capable of providing security for the state 
and its citizens and (2) ensuring 
appropriate governance of these 
institutions in accordance with the 
principles of democracy and civilian 
oversight. 
 
This report is based on a study prepared as 
an input in a policy debate on the role of 
security sector reform in Norwegian 
assistance to peace building in developing 
countries. The report reviews the evolution 
of thinking around external assistance to 
security sector reform, and discusses the 
policies and programmes of the main 
donor agencies. The report also provides 
an overview of Norwegian support to 
security sector reform. This is followed by 
a case study of Southern Africa. The final 
section provides suggestions and 
recommendations for the future role of 
security sector reform in Norwegian 
support to peace building and 
development. 
 
 
II 
 
Traditionally, the concern with security 
sector has focused on military assistance, 
military training and supply of weapons. 
This started changing in the early 1990s 
with the new and growing concern for 
issues such as democratisation and good 
governance, peace building and support 
for demobilisation and post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
 
Three sets of developments converged and 
gave birth to the current thinking around 
security sector reform. One was a number 
of national and regional peace accords 
after the end of the Cold War, which led to 
new thinking about the security-
development relationship. A second was 
the eastward enlargement of the European 
Union and NATO, which led to a new focus 
on the role of the security sector in the new 
democracies. A third factor was the donor 
agencies themselves, which increasingly 
began to address security issues, especially 
in post-conflict countries. 
 
OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee and its Network on Conflict, 
Peace and Development Co-operation 
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became an important forum for the 
evolution of donor approaches to the role 
of development aid in peace building and 
security sector reform. 
 
III 
 
An increasing number of donor agencies 
have started to view security as a 
precondition for poverty reduction and 
development. Now the substantive focus of 
donor activities goes well beyond the 
1990s interest in military spending and 
military roles, and increasingly 
encompasses activities also intended to 
promote a democratic governance of the 
security system. In particular, donors offer 
increased support for justice and internal 
security/police reforms and to the 
rebuilding of security institutions in 
countries emerging out of violent conflict.  
 
However, there is not a shared 
international understanding of security 
sector reform and the approaches 
required. Development agencies define and 
approach security work in keeping with 
their differing institutional mandates, 
organisational priorities and 
administrative constraints. The “war on 
terrorism” paradigm has also had an 
impact on security assistance programmes 
and donor approaches to security sector 
reform.  
 
Some donor agencies, most notably DFID, 
have developed comprehensive stand-alone 
polices and programme for security sector 
reform. Others have policy documents and 
programmes in the broader area of peace 
building. Many are engaged in policy 
discussions within the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee. Several are also 
engaged in supporting security sector 
reform in post-conflict countries, but not 
funded over the aid budget. Much of this 
assistance has primarily focused on 
support to rebuilding operational capacity, 
often inspired by the war on terrorism 
agenda. Many aid donors are reluctant to 
engage in direct support to military 
institutions and to the strengthening of 
their operational capacities. 
 
A notable feature is also that while most 
Northern countries have given priority to a 
strengthening of the operational capacities 
of the police and the justice sector and 
sometimes the military forces they seem to 
have offered limited  attention  to how 
civilian oversight and democratic control 
of the security sector can be promoted. 
This appears to have been reinforced with 
the war on terrorism agenda. 
 
Most donor support for democratic 
oversight of the security sector is also 
pursued under other headings, such as 
support for legal reform, good governance 
or strengthening of democratic institutions. 
However, reviews of donor support to 
peace building suggest that assistance 
suffer from a strategic deficit. While the 
support is characterised by considerable 
strengths and growing professionalism it 
appears that many projects supported fail 
to establish any link to a broader peace 
building strategy for the country in which 
they are implemented. There is often no 
such strategy for them to be linked to, or 
the projects show no connection to it.    
 
IV 
 
Norway has a firm and strong political 
commitment to peace building in 
developing countries. It does not, however, 
have a policy framework or document 
specifically dealing with “security sector 
reform”. Norway is engaged in this debate 
within OECD DAC’s Network on Conflict, 
Peace and Development Co-operation. It 
also addresses several related issues in its 
policy documents on peace building and in 
several aid programmes and projects. 
 
The bulk of Norwegian aid disbursements 
are allocated to various efforts to 
strengthen operational capacities of 
certain institutions, especially the police 
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and the legal institutions. There has also 
been a preference for channelling funds to 
the security sector through the multilateral 
channel and to post-conflict countries. 
Limited funds have been allocated through 
the bilateral channel to Norway’s 
“normal” partner countries in the South. 
 
The Norwegian assistance has several 
notable features. One is a strong emphasis 
on the role of the UN and other 
international organisations. A second is 
the use of Norwegian military and, 
especially, police in its assistance to the 
security sector in post-conflict countries. A 
third feature of the Norwegian policy is the 
strong role of Norwegian and international 
NGOs as channel and vehicle for 
disbursement of aid to this area. Norway 
also has a relatively large pool of 
knowledge based at various research 
institutions and think-tanks which provides 
important policy advise and 
implementation assistance in this area. 
 
There has not been a systematic and 
focused attempt to address issues of 
governance and civilian oversight in the 
direct Norwegian support to the security 
sector. The most comprehensive 
Norwegian contribution is in relation to 
the Balkans. Important lessons and 
experiences can, however, be found in the 
extensive Norwegian support to improved 
governance in other sectors. 
 
V 
 
The regional dimension has been strongly 
emphasised in Norwegian support to peace 
building and development. In many 
countries it is impossible to address 
security issues without also examining the 
wider regional dimensions. Regional co-
operation and harmonisation or norms and 
standards for governance can also help 
ensure the success of nationally based 
security sector reform programmes. 
 
Southern Africa has been the biggest 
recipient of Norwegian bilateral 
development assistance over the past 20 
years. Norway has also been a firm 
supporter of regional co-operation in this 
region. Direct Norwegian support to 
security sector reform has, however, been 
limited and mainly confined to a 
strengthening of operational capacities in 
post-conflict situations. Lessons from the 
general Norwegian bilateral support to 
democratisation and good governance are, 
however, highly relevant for a possible 
future support to the reform of the security 
sector in this region. 
 
VI 
 
Norway rarely uses the term “security 
sector reform”, although they do provide 
support for a number of activities in this 
area, probably with the Norwegian 
assistance to the Balkans as the most 
comprehensive. This report concludes that 
Norway should continue to play a role and 
to provide financial and technical 
assistance to reform of the security sector 
both as part of the support for peace 
building in post-conflict countries, and in 
co-operation with new and consolidating 
democracies in the South. In most cases 
this would probably imply that Norway 
should focus on a component of the 
security sector (e.g. policing and judicial 
reform), either as part of a comprehensive 
international support for security sector 
reform to a particular country or region, 
or as part of Norwegian bilateral support 
for democratisation and good governance. 
 
This report recommends that Norway 
continue to provide development 
assistance addressing security challenges. 
The focus should, however, be sharpened 
to improve effectiveness and efficiency. 
This includes 
  
· Finalising a policy document on 
peace building which includes 
approaches to security sector 
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reform. This involves continued 
engagement with the policy 
discussion within the OECD 
Development Assistance 
Committee; 
· Continuing to use multilateral and 
regional organisations as channels 
for delivering support to reform of 
the security sector; 
· Developing skills and programmes 
in delivering bilateral assistance to 
civilian democratic governance of 
the security sector in Norway’s 
partner countries; 
· Using the Norwegian military and 
police as channels for delivering 
niche products in strengthening 
operational capacities of 
institutions in the security sector; 
· Applying a regional approach and 
regional support channels to assist 
security sector reform in individual 
countries; and 
· Improving co-ordination and 
information-sharing between the 
different Norwegian government 
departments and stakeholders 
involved in security sector reform.   
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Introduction 
 
Security and deve lopment are increasingly seen to be inextricably linked. Safety and security 
are recognized as precondition for development. 22 of the 34 countries furthest away from 
achieving the international development goals, are affected by current and recent conflict. 
More than half of the countries at the bottom of the Human Development Index suffer the 
direct and indirect effects of warfare. Crime continues to plague the security of people in 
many parts of the developing world. And the poor suffer the most also from this violence and 
insecur ity. The traditional understanding of security has also been affected by these trends. 
The focus of security policy is broadening from an almost exclusive focus on state ability to 
also include the well-being of the populations of the state that constitute them. And the notion 
of security institution is broadened. The military is seen as just one instrument of security 
policy with other institutions and instruments given greater prominence. This has provided the 
basis for mainstreaming security policy to a public policy and governance issue, thereby 
inviting public scrutiny of the security policy.     
 
Development assistance has also been 
forced to address the security institutions 
and their role in development. Aid donors 
have recognized that they must be more 
actively engaged. The challenges have been 
two-fold. On the one hand development 
actors are confronted with how to assist in establishing and strengthening appropriate and 
affordable institutions capable of providing security for the state and its citizens. The other 
main challenge has been to ensure appropriate governance of these institutions in accordance 
with the principles of democracy and civilian oversight. These challenges are now 
increasingly referred to as security sector reform. 
 
Norway has a strong profile as supporter of peace and development in many regions in the 
South. Norwegian assistance has addressed conflict prevention, conflict resolution and 
Box 1: What is security sector reform? 
Security sector reform addresses two main challenges: 
(1) establishing and strengthening appropriate and 
affordable institutions capable of providing security for 
the state and its citizens and (2) appropriate governance 
of these institutions in accordance with the principles of 
democracy and civilian oversight. 
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peacemaking as well as peacebuilding. Norway emphasises as pointed out by the Norwegian 
Minister of International Development, in a 2003 speech, that peace-building must address 
social and economic development as well as political and security issues.1 External assistance, 
according to the Norwegian Minister, must also include security sector reform.  The bulk of 
the Norwegian engagement has been concentrated on support to the strengthening of the 
operational capacities of certain types of security ins titutions, especially related to their 
peacekeeping capacity. 
 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is currently drafting guidelines for a Norwegian 
strategy for support to peace building and development, including security sector reform. This 
report is a based upon a study commissioned by the Ministry and is an input to this ongoing 
work. The particular focus  in the commissioned study was the governance dimension of 
security sector reform in Sub-Saharan and Southern Africa. 
 
This report will first review the evolution of thinking around external assistance to the 
security sector. It will then proceed to a discussion of key strategies and programmes of some 
of the main actors in this field. Main lessons learnt and main challenges for future assistance 
to reform of the security of the sector, will then be identified. 
 
The next section provides an overview of current Norwegian support to peace building and 
the security sector and attempts to identify the main features and characteristics of the 
Norwegian contribution. This is followed by a case study from Southern Africa. The 
concluding section provides suggestions and recommendations for future Norwegian support 
to reform of the security sector in developing countries. 
 
The finalisation of the report benefited from many discussions with Norwegian senior 
officials involved in assisting security sector reform and with colleagues at CMI.  Drafts also 
benefited from comments and suggestions from several departments and sections in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice as well as 
from NORAD.  A first draft was submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late April and 
the final report was submitted in October.   
 
Needless to say, the flaws and omissions are entirely mine. I have the responsibility for the 
views and recommendations expressed in this report. 
 
Bergen, December 2003 
   
                                                 
1 See her opening remarks at the Opening and celebration of PRIO’s Centre for the Study of Civil War, Monday, 
6 January 2003 (www.odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/aktuelt/taler/statsraad). 
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Conflict, Development and the Security Sector 
 
Traditionally, the concern with security sector has focused on military assistance, military 
training and supply of weapons. Development involvement has been limited (although some 
engagement did take place in the 1960s based on the premise that the military might play a 
positive role in modernisation and in building new nations). This began to change in the early 
1990s with a new and growing concern with issues such as democratisation and good 
governance, peace building or support for demobilisation and post-conflict reconstruction.  
There was a shift from state and military-centric notions of security to a greater emphasis on 
human security. At the same time there was a growing recognition that democracy and 
poverty reduction could not be achieved and sustained without meeting the basis security 
needs of individuals and communities. A recent study identifies three sets of actors and 
concerns that converged and gave birth to the concept of security sector reform.2 
 
Origins of security sector reform 
 
One is the impetus from a number of national and regional peace accords in the early 1990s. 
A number of these initiatives – typically focusing on procedures for controlled reduction of 
troops and reintegration of former combatants – developed around UN peacekeeping 
operations and post-war reconstruction programmes. The aim was often implementation of 
comprehensive peace settlements. This led to an increasingly greater attention to the security-
                                                 
2 See J. Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, London: The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies 2002 (Adelphi Paper 344). See also N. Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn 
Societies”, pp 719-36 in C. Crocker et al. (eds.), Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of Managing International 
Conflict,  Washington: United States Institute of Peace 2001, C. Smith, “Security-sector reform: development 
breakthrough or institutional engineering?, Journal of Conflict, Security & Development, 1, 2001, 1: 5-19, D. 
Hendrickson, A Review of Security-Sector Reform, London: The Conflict, Security & Development Group, 
Kings College 1999 (Working Papers No 1, September) and D. Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka, “The Challenges 
of Security Sector Reform”, pp. 175-201 in SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002. 
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development relationship. New issues such as policing, small arms and judicial systems were 
addressed and led to a refocusing of UN operations. 
 
Another force behind the reconceptualisation of the security-development relationship was the 
eastward enlargement of the European Union and NATO. Reform of candidate members’ 
security sectors were a condition for eventual membership. This included issues such as 
border control, trafficking in small arms, and the reform of the security forces. It involved 
reintegration and retraining programmes, destruction of weapons, transparency in military 
budgeting and rightsizing of military forces and expenditures, and civilian control of the 
military. 3 For countries in Central and East Europe security sector issues were seen as 
complementing the wider economic and political reforms in which many of them are engaged.  
 
Finally, the development aid community also began to address the issue of peace building. 
This in turn led to a growing concern with the security institutions, their functions and how 
they could be governed. The concept of security sector reform was however, mainly the focus 
of defence- and foreign affairs ministries although most thinking around civilian oversight 
and governance tended to come from the development side. In addition a number of important 
international NGOs and research institutions began to explore these issues and recommend 
policy changes. Compared to Central and East European states most developing countries, 
especially in Africa and Asia, have been cautious about embracing security sector reform. 
  
Part of this new thinking was inspired and drew upon local and regional dynamics in the 
South. The onset of democracy in several Latin American countries led to a process of 
bringing military institutions under the control of national legislatures and to reform of the 
police. In South Africa, the end of apartheid generated a process of far–reaching security 
sector reform.4 Both these developments, and in particular the South African case, gave strong 
impetus to new thinking within the development aid community.       
 
DAC guidelines 
 
The evolution of security and development thinking has perhaps been most evident in the 
work of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee which brought together the main donor 
organisations first in a Task Force and then in a Network on Conflict, Peace and Development 
Co-operation.5 The DAC discussion has broadened in scope from demobilisation and 
reintegration projects, and landmine clearance, to capacity building of security and judicial 
                                                 
3 See e.g., H. Born et al. (eds.): Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies. Proceedings of 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces workshops at the 4 th International Security Forum, Geneva, November 
15-17, 2000, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2002 (Militär und Sozialwissenschaften, vol. 30). This 
book is an initiative of the Swiss-initiated Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). 
This institute is an important think-tank on security sector reform with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe. 
See also M. Caparini, “Security sector reform and NATO and EU enlargement”, pp. 237-60 in SIPRI Yearbook 
2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003. 
4 See more on this in G. Cawthra “Security Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa”, pp. 31-56 in C. 
Cawthra & R. Luckham (eds.): Governing Insecurity. Democratic Control of Military and Security 
Establishments in Transitional Democracies, London: Zed Press 2003.  
5 The DAC guidelines and statements are brought together in The DAC Guidelines. Helping Prevent Violent 
Conflict, Paris: OECD 2001. Important early inputs into the DAC debate was also provided by a commissioned 
DAC study published as “Security issues and development co-operation: A conceptual framework for enhancing 
policy coherence”, The DAC Journal, vol, 2. 2001, No 3: II-31 – II-71. An important contribution prepared for 
the DAC Task Force was also E. Barth Eide et al., Security Sector Reform as a Development Issue, Oslo: 
Norwegian Institute for International Affairs 1999. 
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systems. By 2001 DAC had firmly situated security sector reform within broader efforts to 
promote good governance and democratisation. In the same year the OECD Development 
Ministers formally approved the DAC guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict. 
 
 
 
Box 2: The DAC Recommendations 
A 2001 study prepared to assist OECD DAC countries in developing security sector reform policies and 
more integrated approaches to security and development made six broad recommendations:  
1. Recognise the developmental importance and legitimacy of addressing security issues and security-
system reform, and the need for more coherent and comprehensive international responses to security 
problems ; 
2. Elaborate a comprehensive security-system reform policy that outlines the appropriate roles for actors 
across all areas of donor governments: foreign affairs, financial, trade, security-defence and 
development co-operation; 
3. Identify what kinds of capacity and internal institutional reforms are required in donor governments to 
provide security-system assistance effectively on a partnership basis within the context of a 
development co-operation agenda; 
4. Work to develop an effective ‘division of labour’ amongst development and other relevant 
international actors that will allow each to pursue their comparative advantage without undermining 
common objectives; 
5. Work towards the integration of security-system concerns in the overall foreign and trade policies of 
OECD countries and encourage greater co-operation between OECD countries in this domain; and 
6. Provide assistance in ways that enhance domestic ownership of reform processes and strengthen the 
institutional framework for managing the security system in a manner consistent with sound 
governance practices. 
 
From “Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for 
Enhancing Policy Coherence”, The DAC Journal, vol. 2, 2001, No 3. 
 
 
The security sector, in accordance with the DAC guidelines, comprises all those institutions 
and security forces responsible for ensuring the safety of the state and its citizens against acts 
of violence and coercion. In other words, the security sector includes the armed forces, the 
police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal 
institutions; and the civilian authorities responsible for control and oversight (Parliament, the 
Executive, government departments and other public ins titutions, etc). In addit ion non-
statutory security actors such as armed opposition groups, traditional militias, private security 
firms and civil society actors must be included.6 
 
 “Security sector reform”, according to the DAC guidelines, means  
 
“transformation of the “security system” which includes all the actors, their roles, 
responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is 
more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and 
thus contributes to a well functioning security framework”.7 
 
 
                                                 
6 See e.g. also Chanaa (2002). and International Alert, Saferworld and the Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations, Towards a Better practice framework in security sector reform. Broadening the Debate (Occasional 
SSR Paper No 1 August 2002). 
7 From p. 38 in The DAC Guidelines (2001). In recent documents DAC has also used the term “security system” 
rather than “security sector”.  
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Box 3: DAC definitions 
 
“Security”  is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in 
freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental 
rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not 
detrimental to their health and wellbeing. Underpinning this broader understanding is  a recognition that the 
security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. It follows that a wide range of state 
institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security. This understanding of 
security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promoted by the United Nations Development 
Programme and widely used by development actors. 
 
The “security sector” includes security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage 
them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its 
citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the 
intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions; and the elected and duly appointed civil 
authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defence Ministry, etc.)  
 
“Security sector reform” is the transformation of the “security system” which includes all the actors, their 
roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with 
democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well functioning security 
framework. 
From p. 38 in The DAC Guidelines. Helping Prevent  Violent Conflict, Paris: OECD 2001 
 
Another important impetus to the security sector reform agenda came from trends in 
peacekeeping and peace support missions, especially in the wake of the UN Brahimi report in 
2000 with its call for development and defence communities to work together. In some 
disintegrating states undergoing reconstruction – involving both conflict resolution and 
rebuilding of institutions – the security sector has become a particular important component in 
this process (in particular in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Afghanistan).   
 
Governance and institutional dimensions  
 
The security sector reform agenda revolves around two main dimensions. One is the political 
dimension; the character of the management of the security sector. This revolves around the 
legitimacy of the security sector – in particular promotion of civilian governance and of 
democratic civilian control.8 Security sector reform in this perspective is judged to be part of a 
good governance reform package. It deals with the comprehensive relationship between the 
security sector and the society at large. It is thus, much more than the internal structure of the 
security forces. 
 
Democratic civilian oversight requires democratic institutions to be in place together with a 
basic acceptance of democratic politics by the political leadership, civil servants and security 
personnel. Democratic control of security institutions is also considered strategic for 
                                                 
8 See here also N. Ball et al., “Governance in the security sector”, pp. 263-304 in N. van de Walle, N. Ball & V. 
Ramachandran (eds.), Beyond Structural Adjustment. The Institutional Context of African Development, New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan 2003. The literature is most developed related to parliamentary oversight based on 
European experiences, see H. Born, P. H. Fluri & S. Lunn (eds.): Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of 
Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform, Geneva and Brussels: Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces, and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2003, and H. Born, P. H. Fluri & 
A. Johnsson (eds.), Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. Principles, Mechanisms and Practices, 
Geneva and Belgrade: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2003 (Handbook for Parliamentarians No 5 – 2003). The two last publications are also 
available from www.dcaf.ch. 
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democratisation. These institutions have close and intimate relationships with political power 
and they are important also for the survival of democracy, including the management of 
tensions and insecurities that may be generated by the transition to democracy.   
   
Reform of the security sector requires a democratically elected government with the ability to 
exercise control and oversight over the security sector. It typically seeks to establish civilian 
expertise and control in the ministries of defence, justice and internal affairs, together with 
independent audit units, ombudsman offices and civilian review bodies, and capacity building 
of NGOs, professional associations, media research and advocacy institutions. Civil society 
plays an important role in providing the checks and balances that are necessary for the 
promotion of democratic control of the security sector. 
 
There is also an important economic aspect to the civilian oversight: revenue collection and 
the consumption of resources. A main focus here has been the provision of accountable 
defence budgets and anti-corruption measures as well as conversion issues (transfer of 
resources from the military to the civilian sector). 
 
The institutional dimension focuses upon strengthening the capacities and skills of the 
security institutions. This revolves around the effectiveness of the institutions. It typically 
involves “right-sizing” of the armed forces (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of 
excess forces) and professionalisation (e.g. reorientation away from domestic politics to tasks 
such as territorial defence and peace support activities). It also involves strengthening the 
capacities of the police forces (shift to peacetime policing). This will often involve separating 
the police from the military and armed forces. The judicial and penal or correctional systems 
are also critical in order to strengthen the rule of law and provide control over the security 
forces.  This also applies to other divisions of the security forces (emergency services, border 
guards, customs and immigration, intelligence). “Effectiveness”, in this perspective, cannot be 
separated from governance standards appropriate to a democratic political context. 
 
It must also be emphasised that there may also be tensions between the political and 
institutional dimensions of security sector reform. This is perhaps most sharply evident in a 
number of conflict situations after 11 September 2001, especially in countries such as 
Afghanistan or Iraq. The priority in the US-led “war on terrorism” may pursue building up 
institutional capacities in a way which undermine efforts to build democratic governance. 
  
“Security sector reform” thus covers a very wide area and comprises many elements. These 
elements can be mixed in innumerable ways depending on the context, but in nearly all cases 
practically all elements will have to be addressed in one way or another. There is no “one size 
fits all” solution to security sector reform. Careful attention must be paid to national 
variations. Some lessons can, however, be extracted from the emerging literature. Two main 
categories of countries may be distinguished. On the one hand there are transitional and 
consolidating democracies such as South Africa, Chile, Mozambique and Ghana. These are 
countries where the state has remained reasonably stable during the transition to democracy, 
and its security institutions have remained largely intact. 
 
Reform of the security sector is far more difficult in countries where violence remains 
endemic; a democratic transition has failed; the security structures have fractured or 
disintegrated and been replaced by informal militias and/or external forces; or the state has 
collapsed. Countries such as Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, the DR Congo, Sri 
Lanka, Sierra Leone and Iraq are examples of such countries. 
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A second observation is that the international or regional security environment is often very 
critical for the success of security sector reform. A stable external environment of relative 
security is often a requirement for democratisation and security sector reform. Support for 
regional security organisations or mechanisms are therefore important as a confidence- and 
security-building measure which may help facilitate domestic reform. 
 
A third observation is that although democratisation is a necessary requirement for security 
sector reform it is not sufficient. It also – and this is a main lesson from the South African 
case – requires domestic commitment to a transformation of the security sector and 
demilitarisation of the state. Domestic ownership is crucial if security sector reform shall be 
sustainable. 
 
A fourth observation is the important role played by civil society in nearly all cases of 
successful security sector reform. They may mobilise or control popular masses, fill policy 
gaps with their expertise and form a counterweight to security establishments. The role of 
civil society does, however, vary considerably. They tend to be especially prominent during 
transitions while their influence tends to wane once a legitimate democratic regime has been 
established.            
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External Assistance to Security Sector Reform 
 
 
An increasing number of donor agencies perceive security as a precondition for poverty 
reduction and development. The notion of “security sector” as constituting something broader 
than just the armed forces has not only entered the discourse of NGOs, academics, policy 
makers and OECD’s Development Assistance Committee – it has also largely been accepted. 
Several important donors have begun to engage with aspects and dimensions of reform and 
governance of the security sector – especially in relation to aid-dependent countries in Africa 
other developing countries. However, this does not imply that there is shared international 
understanding of security sector reform and the approaches required. Development agencies 
define and approach security work in keeping with their differing institutional mandates, 
organisational priorities and administrative constraints. The “war on terrorism” paradigm after 
11 September 2001 has also had an impact on security assistance programmes and donor 
approaches to security sector reform.  This is currently most strongly felt in the fight against 
terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. In these situations aid agencies and governance issues play 
a far more limited role with the main focus being to build operational capacities.    
  
This section summarises key policies and programmes of some of the main actors’ activities 
in this area.9 
 
 
                                                 
9 Useful sources of information are emerging from two British research milieus financially supported by DFID 
and the UK Government’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Conflict, Security & Development Group based 
at Kings College in London (http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk) and the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector 
Reform (GFN-SSR)  based at Cranfield University’s Shrivenham Campus (www.gfn-ssr.org). Both put out a 
number of publications, newsletters as well as two important journals (also available at their website) Journal of 
Conflict, Security & Development (published since 2001) and the Journal of Security Sector Management (the 
first issue appeared in March 2003). A number of important unpublished consultancy reports, including reviews 
of security sector reform in all regions of the world have also appeared under the auspices of the OECD DAC 
Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. 
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The UN and the international financial inst itutions 
  
The United Nations is an important actor in security and development. It has played a 
particular important role in the peacekeeping field. More than 50 operations have been 
deployed since the launch of the UN peacekeeping operations more than 50 years ago. With 
the end of the Cold War, the UN was assumed placed centre stage in efforts to resolve 
outstanding conflicts. However, this was not always accompanied by coherent policies or 
integrated military and political responses.10 
 
The mandate of the UN operations expanded during the 1990s. This was evident in a growing 
involvement in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DD&R). 
However, it is perhaps most evident in the UN’s role in the policing component of 
peacekeeping. The UN has been the main actor in this area since the Congo operation in the 
1960s. The mandate in the first decades was, however, limited and mainly confined to 
monitoring. The Namibia operation in 1989-90 saw a major expansion in terms of the size of 
the UN police forces, and subsequent operations saw a major expansion also of the mandate. 
The UN civpol operations now increasingly began to focus training, support and advice to the  
restructuring of the local police forces. In some cases (East Timor and Kosovo) the mandate 
also went beyond monitoring and training to include executive policing. 11 
 
The 2000 report from the UN’s Brahimi panel on peacekeeping operations inter alia called 
for UNDP, in co-operation with other UN institutions, to take the lead in implementing peace 
building activities. UNDP seeks to play a central role in the UN’s crisis prevention and peace 
building efforts. It also attempts to address some of the causes of conflict through its various 
projects. However, it still has to develop a comprehensive approach and operational 
guidelines that focus directly on the security sector. Its own programmes are in most cases 
small, and there is an element of rivalry between the various UN agencies involved. Different 
UN agencies are currently involved in security sector reform issues (in addition to the UNDP 
this includes, e.g., the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Department of 
Political Affairs). UNDP has tended to play a minor role in many of the major UN missions 
such as the one in East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan.  
 
UNDP has a Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) with a focus on crisis and 
post-conflict countries. This unit established in 2002 a “Justice and Security Sector Reform” 
team. This is a small team which seeks to further develop the UNDP approach as well as 
providing technical support and assistance to regional and country offices.12 By 2004 it may 
also be in a position to provide operational support, especially related to selected post-conflict 
countries. UNDP has a stronger focus on issues related to justice and the legal sector and has 
therefore tended to use the term “justice and security sector reform”. BCPR also has a small 
team on small arms.  
 
                                                 
10 See the overview in R. Thakur and A. Schnable: “Cascading generations of peacekeeping: Across the 
Mogadishu line to Kosovo and Timor”, pp. 3-25 in R Thakur and A. Schnable (eds.): United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations. Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, Tokyo: United Nations University Press 
2001.  
11 Cf. A. S. Hansen: From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations, London: The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies 2002 (Adelphi Paper No 343) and T. Tanke Holm and E. Barth Eide (eds.): Peace 
Building and Police Reform, London: Frank Cass 2000. 
12 See N. Ball: Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP, 9 October 2002 
(www.undp.org/erd/jssr/UNDP_SSR_Concept_Paper_Oct_9_2002.doc) and Justice and Security Sector Reform. 
BCPR’s programmatic approach. November 2002 (www.undp.org/erd/jssr/docs/jssrprogrammaticapproach.pdf)   
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UNDP provides assistance to projects with strong relevance for the security sector reform. 
Some may be linked to its governance/democratisation programme but more importantly such 
projects are located within its crisis and post-conflict programme. Some if its projects in post-
conflict areas such as Central America, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans have 
focused on security components such as small arms, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-
combatants, and prison and police reform. In Guatemala, in particular, UNDP played an 
important role in developing a judicial assistance project. 
 
UNDP has also sought to assist in facilitating the emergence of an enabling environment for 
reform of the security sector. In a few countries UNDP has been positioned to bring 
stakeholders together and to facilitate development of national strategies (although UNDP’s 
special relations with the host government may also act as an obstacle). Zimbabwe may be an 
example of UNDP’s efforts to facilitate such a political process (although the outcome is 
unclear). In 2003, UNDP signed a project document with the government of Zimbabwe to 
enhance the capacity of the government, the business community and civil society to manage 
and transform the conflict in the country. The intention is also to provide training for 
stakeholders in the security sector.13 
  
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have not focused on the broader issues 
of security sector reform, but they have – beginning in the late 1980s – focused on the level of 
military expenditure in developing countries. A main concern was the impact of such 
spending on the macroeconomic stability. The World Bank also became increasingly involved 
with other aspects of the security and development relationship through policy studies and 
lending operations to countries emerging from violent conflict. A main initial focus for these 
lending operations was demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. This began with a 
World Bank-designed programme in Uganda in the early 1990s to demobilise and reintegrate 
some 30 to 50 000 ex-combatants and their families. The programme itself emerged out of a 
desire to reduce public expenditure on defence, a key objective in the Bank’s adjustment 
operation in that country. 14 The Bank’s increasing emphasis on governance issues has 
provided further impetus towards focusing on security and development issues, but it has not 
led to particular interventions targeting the governance of the security sector.15 
 
It is important to emphasise that the policies and activities of the multilaterals also evolve. 
There is no organisation-wide agreement within either of the multilateral organisations on 
their approach to security sector reform. Their financial strength is also extremely uneven - 
the Bank is in a very solid position while the UNDP has very limited funds at its disposal. 
Ideally these organisations should define their comparative advantages. This may happen 
gradually. The World Bank may, e.g., focus on security expenditures and incorporate this into 
their public expenditure work (including financial management). UNDP may have a longer 
way to go before a strategy has been developed. They may also to a greater extent focus on 
facilitating the process towards security sector reform and less on specific project 
implementation.  
  
                                                 
13 See the unpublished project document, Government of Zimbabwe/UNDP, Developing capacity for negotiation 
skills and conflict transformation in Zimbabwe, n.p. (Harare), n.d. (2003). The document was prepared with 
technical assistance from regional experts through a South African NGO (Centre for Conflict Resolution). 
14 See also N. Coletta et al.: Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilisation and Reintegration of 
Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda , Washington, D.C.: World Bank 1996. 
15 Cf. the discussion in N. Ball: “Transforming security sectors: the IMF and World Bank approaches”, Journal 
of Conflict, Security & Development , vol. 1, No 1 (2001): 45-66. 
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European Union  
Recently, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a major actor. It has applied pressure and 
incentives, and provided guidance and assistance for the restructuring of elements of the 
security sector of applicant states and in transitional, post-conflict and developing countries.  
The “carrot” of eventual membership is a significant source of leverage in relations to 
countries in Central and East Europe.16  Much of its activities at Headquarters in this area 
have been focused on building capacity for what is termed “civilian crisis management” and 
other dimensions of “internal security reform”. Within this category the main focus has been 
to assist police reform in post-conflict reconstruction. The main and bigger operational 
programme has been the newly established (2002) European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and other and related activities in the Balkans). The EUPM 
comprises some 500 police officers (mainly from the EU), some 50 civilian experts and a 
local staff of 300 (until the end of 2002 the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina had the 
responsibility for the International Police Task Force in the country). The mandate and 
objectives have become fairly comprehensive. When support for the local police began in the 
mid-1990s, the focus was on training and assistance. This has now expanded to include 
support for more comprehensive police reform and a shift towards promoting democratic 
policing, including also support for improved linkages to the justice sector and the penal 
system. 17 The police reform programme is an addition to traditional economic assistance and 
the carrot of possible future membership in the EU.  
 
The evolution of the EU approach to policing closely resembles the general UN approach to 
assistance to policing in peace operations and reconstruction. The EU has emphasised civilian 
components and the linkages between the role of the police, the judiciary and the military in 
its Balkan operations (and with the US and NATO concentrating on the military dimensions). 
Its approach has echoed views and recommendations put forward in the Brahimi Report on 
UN peacekeeping. 
 
OSCE and NATO 
 
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has also highlighted 
security reform issues.18 Through its work on arms control and confidence and security 
building measures, the member countries agreed (in 1994) on a Code of Conduct for political-
military aspects of security. The OSCE Code of Conduct devotes an entire section (VII, ##20-
33) to the democratic control of military, paramilitary and security forces. States would 
clearly define the roles and missions of such forces (#21), provide for legislative approval of 
defence expenditures (#22), ensure that its armed forces were politically neutral (#23), guard 
against accidental or unauthorised use of military means (#24), ensure that recruitment was 
consistent with human rights and fundamental freedoms (#27), and make widely available the 
international humanitarian law of war (#29). Furthermore the Code of Conduct emphasises 
that defence policy and doctrine must be consistent with international law (#35) and that 
                                                 
16 Cf. M. Caparini (2003). 
17 See more on this in K. M. Ousland: “Civilian crisis management – a study of the EUPM” (in Norwegian) pp. 
83-101 in P. Rieker & S. Ulriksen (eds.): En annerledes supermakt? Sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikken i EU, 
Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2003.  
18 Cf. also an overview of procedures and mechanisms developed by both OSCE and NATO in this area in W. F. 
van Eekelen: “Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The National and International Parliamentary Dimension”, 
pp. 57-121 in H. Born, P. H. Fluri & S. Lunn (eds.) (2003). 
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internal security missions should be assigned in conformity with constitutional procedures 
(#36). 
 
Democracy, human rights and humanitarian questions represent another main working area 
for OSCE. Work on these issues has not focused specifically on security sector issues, but has 
tended to focus on elections and election monitoring as well as on monitoring of the human 
rights situation. Its activities have, however, been more extens ive in the Balkans and have  
included projects such as the establishment (with Norwegian support) of a police academy in 
Kosovo. 
 
OSCE has provided important guidelines although its operational work has been hampered by 
differences of approach between the EU, the US and Russia. 
 
NATO has also begun to address security sector reform issues, especially related to the 
defence sector, including a focus on the role of civilian oversight of armed forces.19 This 
began with the enlargement of the organisation with new members from Central and East 
Europe. A key step was the 1994 Partnership for Peace document which also brought in other 
OSCE countries. Each partner was committed to fulfil a number of objectives. This included 
transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes and democratic control of 
the armed forces. This was also reaffirmed in NATO’s Membership Action Plan. In a similar 
way as the EU the “carrot” of membership is a source of leverage. NATO wields considerable 
influence over which issues and structures are tackled in the domestic reform processes of 
applicant states. NATO’s role has however, been made more complicated by the tensions in 
transatlantic relations, especially over the Iraq issue.   
 
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has also, since 1989, added “development of 
parliamentary mechanisms and practices essential for the effective democratic control of 
armed forces” to its list of activities and aims.   
 
Bilateral donors 
 
A 2002-2003 survey of donors commissioned by the OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace 
and Development Co-operation demonstrates that development actors are increasingly 
engaging in security-related work.20 The substantive focus of donor activities now goes well 
beyond the 1990s interest in military spending and military roles, and increasingly 
encompasses activities intended to strengthen capacities of security institutions. Donors 
provide strong support for justice and internal security/police reforms and for activities 
designed to demilitarise society. They are giving limited but growing attention to 
strengthening civil oversight of the security bodies and to enhancing the capacity of civil 
management bodies. However, donors still do very little work towards non-state actors 
(beyond Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DD&R) programmes) and for the 
most part seem unfamiliar with the value of activities intended to create an environment in 
which serious governance-oriented reforms can go forward. 
 
                                                 
19 See especially the overview and discussion in M. Caparini (2003).  
20 This section is based on the presentation of the findings in Dylan Hendrickson and Nicole Ball: Good Practice 
and Working Principles in Security Sector Reform. Draft Note Prepared for the OECD DAC Task Team on 
Security Sector Reform, 27 August 2003. 
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The most comprehensive policy has emerged from the United Kingdom and its Department 
for International Development (DFID). In early 1999 the Development Secretary, Clare Short, 
launched a security sector reform initiative which for the first time in official UK aid policy 
documents acknowledged the link between good governance, sustainable development and 
security sector reform. This culminated with the publication in late 2002 of comprehensive 
practical guidelines for DFID governance advisors and programme managers. The main focus 
is on the military, paramilitary and intelligence services and the civilian structures responsible 
for their oversight and control. There was more limited attention in this document to policing 
and the justice system.21 
 
DFID does not provide direct support to the military, but focuses on the governance agenda 
(civilian oversight) and the role of civil society. This is however, co-ordinated with a number 
of other government departments, primarily the Foreign Office (providing the political 
framework but also with their own projects) and departments providing specialised assistance 
to the military (Ministry of Defence) or the police (Home Affairs). This co-ordination also 
applies to the field office involving, in particular, defence advisors in embassies and high 
commissions. An interdepartmental working group has been established to help develop a 
government-wide security sector policy. It expects to conclude that work by the end of 2003. 
 
Interdepartmental co-operation/coherence in the UK has also been facilitated by the 
establishment of special funding mechanisms. The UK has created two inter-departmental 
funding pools, the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) and the African Conflict 
Prevention Pool (ACPP) in order to improve the UK’s conflict prevention policy and 
effectiveness. Both pools have security sector reform as one of the thematic priorities. Much 
of UK and DFID’s support to security sector reform is financed through these two pools.22 
 
The key political challenges identified in DFID’s guidelines are military disengagements from 
politics; military disengagements from other non-military roles; redefinition of security roles; 
civilian policy-making role; re-professionalisation of the military; military restructuring and 
demobilisation; regional frameworks for peace; and management of relations with donors. 
The guidelines provide help in analysing and providing a diagnosis. See the box below. 
 
Box 4: Supporting security sector reform – entry points 
 
DFID’s guidelines for security sector reform lists seven areas most likely to serve as entry points for support to 
sector reform. The particular entry point chosen will vary depending on local contexts. The seven entry points 
are: 
1. Building public awareness and engagement on security issues (through educational activities, 
capacity building among civil society groups, workshops and seminars bringing stakeholders 
together); 
2. Building strategic planning capacity for governments (capacity building for civilian and 
security personnel to conduct joint planning, institutional evaluations and produce legislation, 
and to support development of central co-ordination and policy-making machinery for 
security matters); 
3. Strengthening constitutional and legal frameworks, including relations between security 
forces, the legislature and the executive and their effective operation (technical assistance and 
                                                 
21 See the DFID’s Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, London: DFID 2002. Other 
dimensions are covered in separate guidelines on assistance with policing and the civil justice system in Safety, 
Security and Accessible Justice for All: Putting Policy into Practice, London: DFID 2002. See also S. Lawry-
White, Review of the UK Government Approach to Peace Building and Synthesis of Lessons Learned from UK 
Government funded Peace Building Projects, Contribution to the Joint Utstein Study of Peace Building , n.p. 
Performance Assessment Resource Centre, DFID, August 2003. 
22 Cf. the presentation of these two pools and their current priorities in S. Lawry-White (2003). 
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advise on roles and mandates, constitutional law, specific legislation and human rights issues);  
4. Strengthening civil oversight mechanisms, including the legislature, ministers and civil 
servants, and civil society bodies (technical experts and advice, seminars and training courses, 
study visits, civil service reform/strengthening, support for security think tanks);  
5. Strengthening financial management systems through improved governance mechanisms 
(support for transparency, accountability, anti-corruption, auditing);  
6. Facilitating war-to-peace transitions by assisting in restoring basic state security capacity and 
addressing the legacies of war (policing and public security, civil oversight, demobilisation 
and reintegration, disarmament); and 
7. Improving human resource management through promoting a sense of public duty and 
political neutrality (training to improve civil control, relations with public and respect for 
international law and human rights).  
 
 
The guidelines also emphasises donor co-ordination. In particular DFID calls for 
incorporating security sector issues into donor country assistance strategies, public 
expenditure reviews, Comprehensive Development Frameworks, and the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP). The PRSP process, according to DFID, offers potentially important 
mechanisms for mainstreaming security sector issues into development policy. 
 
Sierra Leone is the major example of how various British government departments have 
teamed up (albeit not without tensions) to support reform of the security sector since the UK’s 
military intervention. DFID has funded a variety of activities that come under the heading 
civilian control of the security sector, including, with assistance from the Ministry of Defence, 
the development of a national security policy, the reorganisation of the defence ministry and 
the development of its management capacity. The Ministry of Defence and the UK armed 
forces are helping to restructure and train the national army and to strengthen its management 
capacity. The Home Office has provided personnel to help manage and reform the national 
police service. The Foreign Office has provided funding for military education and training 
and is active in supporting efforts to consolidate the peace process, including the promotion of 
a UN ban on import of rough diamonds other than those certified by the government of Sierra 
Leone.23 
 
Beyond DFID, hardly any bilateral donor has developed stand-alone polices and programmes 
on security sector reform. Several have however, policy documents and programmes in the 
broader area of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. Many are also engaged in the 
policy discussion within the OECD Development Assistance Committee on the role of 
security sector reform within development co-operation. Furthermore, many countries are 
engaged in support to the security sector, often outside development aid budgets. Afghanistan 
and Iraq are major examples. Much of this assistance to the security sector has primarily been 
focused on rebuilding operational capacity, often inspired by the “war on terrorism” agenda, 
and has been less concerned with the governance dimension of security sector. 
   
Denmark has, among the Scandinavian countries, been in forefront in developing a strategy 
for providing support to conflict prevention and conflict management.24 They do not attempt 
to address systematically the issue of the governance of the security sector, but they have 
provided assistance to a number of innovative projects focusing of aspects of governance, 
especially in Southern Africa. Since the early 1990s Denmark has been a major donor to a 
                                                 
23 See more on Britain and the Sierra Leone case in Comfort Ero, “Sierra Leone: the legacies of authoritarianism 
and political violence”, pp. 232-253 in C. Cawthra & R. Luckham (eds.) (2003).  
24 Cf. also the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Violent Conflicts in Developing Countries, Copenhagen 2000 
(MFA Issues in Focus). 
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couple of research/civil society- initiatives (the Defence Management Programme in 
Johannesburg and the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town) which has played an 
important and effective role in shaping South African thinking on security sector reform and 
civilian oversight. Denmark has also been the chief donor behind the establishment of 
SADC’s Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre which was a pivotal attempt at building 
regional peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa. They have also provided assistance to 
major legal reform programmes in the region. 
 
Sweden has a policy document and action plan on conflict prevention. 25 They do not 
specifically address the issue of security sector reform although several Swedish-funded 
projects address aspects of this (e.g., judicial reform, civil society interventions, human 
rights). Most assistance is given to various activities facilitating dialogue, to small arms 
control and to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. A process to 
revise its current policy documents on conflict management was initiated in 2003 and is 
expected to be completed in 2004. 
 
Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development established in 
early 2003 a “Security Sector Reform Project” based at its Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ). This is one of several pilot programmes established to develop approaches, methods 
and instruments for peace building. 26 The security sector reform programme has an overall 
objective to develop methods and procedures that can strengthen democratic and civil 
oversight over the security sector. The programme will provide advisory services in three 
priority thematic areas: community policing, interface between the judiciary and the police, 
and cross-cutting themes. Projects at this stage are few in numbers with activities, often at the 
micro- level, concentrated in areas such as policing, judicial reform or demobilisation. Outside 
the aid framework, major German-funded activities have however, been implemented in post-
conflict countries (e.g. - and in particular - policing in Afghanistan). Germany has also taken 
the lead in efforts to the get the World Bank to focus more on security sector expenditures. 
 
The Netherlands is another country with an emerging interest in this area. The main activities 
supported through peace building and good governance division in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs currently revolves around conflict management in the Sudan and the Great Lakes. 
Beyond this the Dutch aid efforts appear mainly to have been channelled into human rights, 
legal reform and civil society. 27 
 
The Swiss government initiated (in 2000) an international foundation – The Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces – which has produced a number of important 
studies and lessons learnt on civilian oversight, particularly related to the role of Parliament. 
40 countries are members of this foundation which primarily focuses on Central and Eastern 
Europe. The Centre is expected to increasingly also focus on experiences from developing 
countries. 
                                                 
25 See Preventing Violent Conflict – A Swedish Action Plan (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999) and 
Preventing Violent Conflict – Swedish Policy for the 21st Century (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2000). Cf. also a recent discussion document from Sida Reflection on Development Co-operation and Violent 
Conflict (www.sida.se/content/1/c6/01/88//00/Info-konfl-mgmt.doc).   
26 See also a recent evaluation of German assistance to peace building; U. Kievelitz, G. Kruk & N. Frieters., 
Joint Utstein Study of Peace Building, National Report on Germany, Bonn: GTZ 2003  (available at      
http://www.gtz.de/crisisprevention/download/utstein.pdf )  
27 See Georg Frerks et al., Dutch Policies and Activities Directed at Peacebuilding, Contribution to the Joint 
Utstein Study of Peacebuilding , The Hague: The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Disaster Studies, 
Wageningen University, 2003 
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A first observation emerging from this brief overview of bilateral donors is that most donor 
agencies generally appear to be weak on policy guidelines and strategies for security sector 
reform. Many are, however, increasingly engaged in supporting a range of related activities, 
mostly as part of broader peace building efforts. This is perhaps most evident in some of the 
major current peace building and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in countries such as East 
Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. 
 
A recent major evaluation of peace building projects supported by the four Utstein 
governments – Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK – finds that there are 
considerable strengths and growing professionalism in the support to peace building. 28 The 
study does, however, also identify a major strategic deficit in the peace building efforts of the 
Utstein partners. Most projects supported failed to establish any link to a broader peace 
building strategy for the country in which they are implemented – either because there is no 
such strategy for them to be linked to, or because the projects show no connection to it. One 
expects that such findings would also apply to projects related to reform of the security sector.    
 
A second observation is that in post-conflict countries – especially in Afghanistan, Iraq, the  
Balkans and former Soviet Republics – the bilateral development aid institutions often play a 
less prominent role. Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries have tended to be far more 
prominent in policy formulation and implementation compared to the aid agencies. This has 
been reinforced with the focus on the “war on terrorism”. In transitional and consolidating 
democracies in developing countries and especially in Africa the bilateral aid agencies have 
been far more important. 
 
A third observation is that the bilateral aid agencies have tended to focus more on the justice 
dimension while foreign affairs and defence ministries have focused more on the military and 
external security dimension. A fourth trend is that the bulk of assistance to security sector 
reform, appears to be directed towards what in Ch. 2 was referred to as the institutional 
dimension – supporting efforts to build capacity and skills. Relatively modest assistance 
appears to be channelled towards the political dimension – democratic and civilian oversight 
and management issues. 
 
A final observation is also that many donor agencies are concerned with the eligibility of 
peace and security-related assistance as official development assistance. Donor countries are 
working together in the OECD Development Assistance Committee to agree on the 
definitions of the characteristics and boundaries of aid that can be categorised and calculated 
as Official Development Assistance. Military assistance has never been accepted as 
development aid, but with the close linkages between security and development donors have 
been forced to rethink this classification. There is an agreement to include a broad range of 
security-related assistance as development aid. This includes assistance to a number of 
civilian, security-related development activities, including civilian oversight over police 
forces, police and judicial reform, and justice systems. Various activities under UN post-
conflict peace-building operations such as demobilisation, conversion of production facilities 
from military to civilian outputs; small arms control; and removal of explosive mines for 
developmental purposes are also included. However, this eligibility does not cover support to 
                                                 
28 See Dan Smith, Getting their act together. Towards a strategic framework for peace building. Synthesis report 
of the joint Utstein study of peace building, Oslo: PRIO November 2003 (commissioned by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (available from www.prio.no). 
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civilian oversight of defence and military issues which is an important dimension of any 
democratic reform of the security sector.29  
 
Currently, there is a debate within the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee whether 
to expand the list of security related activities 
eligible for support. For some countries, such 
as the Scandinavian countries, this is de facto 
a precondition for support to security sector 
reform which directly involves the defence 
and military institutions. Many member 
countries are reluctant to make such an 
expansion. There is a special sensitivity 
around security-related assistance in light of 
the Cold War experience and other instances 
of assistance to security forces which 
subsequently engaged in human rights 
violations, attacked neighbouring countries, 
or committed other atrocities. There is also a 
concern that scarce aid funds will be diverted from core development co-operation to 
activities which more appropriately may be financed from other budgets. There is also a 
concern that if parts of certain activities (e.g. civilian oversight over the military) could be 
considered ODA-eligible, identifying and accounting for these components could be 
extremely difficult. 
 
Lessons and challenges for external assistance 
 
The security sector reform agenda appears extremely ambitious and, if fully implemented, 
promises a great deal. It requires major and radical social and institutional changes that entail 
considerable time and resources. Surveys also indicate, as pointed out above, that 
development actors are increasingly engaged in security-related work. This also increasingly 
encompasses activities intended to promote democratic governance of the security sector. 
Most of the support for civilian oversight is, however, pursued under other headings such as 
support for legal reform, good governance or strengthening of democratic institutions with 
limited or nor specific focus on the security sector as such. 
 
The debate and the literature on security sector reform are largely informed by a small group 
of consultants, research and advocacy institutions and by engagements by the military and the 
police forces in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the institutional implementation lags  
behind the vision. With a couple of exceptions, donors and major actors do not have an 
explicit security sector reform agenda. In most cases, what we see is that a number of existing 
programmes and projects are grouped together and classified as support to reform of the 
security sector. And in many cases this may be a sensible approach, since security sector 
reform is an extremely ambitious agenda. This presupposes, however, that the donor has a 
clear understanding of how the individual project supported may contribute to security sector 
reform. 
 
                                                 
29 See also pp 40 in OECD, The DAC Guidelines (2001). 
Box 5: Is support for security sector reform ODA-
eligible? 
 
Support for security sector reform is a grey area in 
OECD’s classification. A broad range of support for 
peace and security is eligible for classification as 
Official Development Assistance. This includes 
support to a number of civilian, security-related 
development activities, including civilian oversight 
over police forces, police and judicial reform, and 
justice systems. Various activities under UN post-
conflict peace-building operations such as 
demobilisation, conversion of production facilities 
from military to civilian outputs; small arms control; 
and removal of explosive mines for developmental 
purposes are also included. This eligibility does not 
cover support to civilian oversight of defence and 
military issues . 
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Operational implementation and success are still limited. New security structures may have 
with some success been set up or supported by international donors and actors in some post-
conflict countries in Africa (e.g. Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa), in Central 
America (e.g. Guatemala), in Asia (e.g. Cambodia and East Timor) and in Central and East 
Europe (e.g., Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo). Some of the more successful examples, 
especially in relation to democratic and civilian oversight (such as in South Africa and in 
some South American countries), have however, largely been “home grown” and the outcome 
of domestic processes although foreign donors may have contributed important financial 
support at critical stages. 
 
Some general findings based on the relatively few cases of external support to reform of the 
security sector can be drawn. 30  
 
One is the general insufficient attention to civilian oversight and democratic control of the 
security sector. Attention to this is often either absent or late in the process of promoting 
reform of the sector. The preference is strengthening the operational capacities of the various 
institutions comprising the security sector. 
 
A second finding is the tension between development objectives on the one hand, and 
traditional military aid as extension of commercial and foreign policy objectives on the other. 
This was also illustrated with the above-mentioned case of Sierra Leone. While one British 
government department argued about the negative consequences of excessive military 
spending, another department called for increased arms export. Both departments used the 
jargon of secur ity sector reform to justify their arguments. More recent examples are the cases 
of Afghanistan and Iraq. Here development objectives such as the governance dimension may 
be at odds with other foreign policy/security objectives (such as anti-terrorism objectives). 
 
For some, and this include many of the dominant stakeholders among the Northern donors, 
security sector reform can be used to justify a continuation of traditional military assistance. 
Selling arms and promoting reform of the security sector are not always reconcilable. These 
tensions have been reinforced with the “war on terrorism” agenda. The immediate priority is 
now often to strengthen the operational capacities of the police or the army with governance-
related reforms being less important. 
 
A third observation is that support to reform of the security sector sometimes appears to be 
attempts to remould military institutions according to the traditions of the donor. Projects 
initiated and supported by external donors often do not take sufficient account of local 
contexts. Security sector institutions in many developing countries may play very different 
societal roles than security institutions in Northern democracies. The strategic priorities of the 
security sector in the South may also be very different. They may, e.g., be far more concerned 
with regime security than with citizen security. Moreover, many external interventions risk 
over-emphasizing the security sector as a target for funds and as an agent of change. The 
external assistance may serve to insulate security sector reform from the wider political 
                                                 
30 In addition to the literature mentioned above, especially in note 2, some of the arguments in the following are 
also based on the important 2003-collection of studies - Governing Insecurity - edited by G. Cawthra and R. 
Luckham (see above). See also more on post-conflict and collapsed states in A. Suhrke, “Peacekeepers as 
Nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 8, 2001, 4: 1-20, N. 
Cooper & M. Pugh: Security Sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies, London: The Conflict, Security & 
Development Group, Kings College 2002 (Working Paper No 5) and the important recent evaluation from the 
same institute: A Review of Peace Operations. A Case for Change – Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, 
Afghanistan , London March 2003. 
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economy and other factors which may be more important in development and management of 
a specific conflict. 
 
A fourth finding is that military institutions and the police in Northern donor countries have 
been major channels for delivering assistance to security sector reform. These institutions 
possess valuable technical skills, but they are not always well-suited to address certain key 
dimensions of reforming the security sector. This includes working with governments to 
develop and design comprehensive reform strategies, capacity-building of civil oversight 
bodies or assistance to civil society. Their main strength appears to in delivering traditional 
military (and police) assistance combined with specialised skills in certain areas, such as 
peacekeeping and international law. 
 
Large-scale engagement of military and police officers – especially in post-conflict countries 
as seen in the Balkans - are also costly and difficult to fund over longer periods. Donor 
countries are reluctant to deploy highly skilled and qualified personnel, especially police 
officers, for such service. Such personnel may be scarce also in the home or deploying 
countries. 
 
A fifth observation is insufficient attention to the operational level for rule-of- law strategy. A 
main shortcoming revolves around insufficient co-ordination between police reform on the 
one side and the justice sector on the other. Lack of a coherent strategy and insufficient co-
ordination are recurrent problems. 
 
A sixth observation emerging from nearly all cases, is that security defies bureaucratic 
compartmentalisation. The understanding of security needs to be expanded to address the 
range of security threats faced by post-conflict countries – it may include issues such as 
smuggling, organised transborder crime and militia threats. 
 
Finally, and most importantly: the process of security sector reform has often been as 
important to success as its substance. The key stakeholders need to be brought on board. This 
includes not just the security decisions makers and managers themselves, but also national 
legislatures, the media and informed groups in civil and political society.  
 
These findings pose several challenges for aid donors. Two shall be singled out for the 
purpose of this paper. 
 
One is the need to pay greater attention to 
civilian oversight in the assistance 
programme. Civilian oversight mechanisms 
need to be established early on. This is a 
major capacity building exercise and is linked 
to the development of a viable civil service 
structure. To achieve this, donor agencies 
must pay greater attention to how they can 
assist the critical tasks of building a 
nationally-owned vision of security and preparing the political and policy terrain for security 
sector reform through national dialogue. 
 
A second challenge relates to management within donor agencies and the need to develop an 
appropriate context-specific strategy guiding the support for security strategy. This may be 
Box 6: Challenges for donor agencies 
Most Northern countries prioritise strengthening of the 
operational capacities of the police and the armed 
forces in their support to the security sector. This may 
have been reinforced with the “war on terrorism” 
agenda. There is insufficient attention to the need for 
civilian oversight and democratic control of the 
security sector in external assistance. Donors also 
need to develop a strategic framework for their 
interventions. 
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anchored in a peace building approach or a strategy for support to democratis ation. This 
involves establishing a strategic planning mechanism, undertake an analysis of the security 
sector, provide a needs and a feasibility assessment, and identify the activities and goals of 
particular interventions.  
 
It should be noted that it is particularly demanding to provide assistance to and promoting 
good governance in an area as politically sensitive as security policy and reform of security 
institutions. It is not sufficient to simply provide technical assistance to fragmented aspects of 
the security sector. Local ownership and policy dialogue become very important and donor 
co-ordination is crucial. Donor staff also needs to have specialised skills to handle the 
conceptual and operational security sector issues. They need to be familiar with local contexts 
and have the skills to analyse political trends and security challenges. They have to be in a 
position to provide swift and flexible responses to windows of opportunities. Above all 
donors must be able to provide assistance to processes that can create an environment 
enabling reform of the security sector. 
 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and its Network on Conflict, Peace and 
Development Co-operation have taken the lead in developing guidelines for assistance to 
security sector reform. Its most recent draft document (from November 2003) provides 
guidelines on policy and good practice.31 It emphasises process and identifies working 
principles (see the outline in Box 7).  Donors and partners are encouraged to adhere to these.      
 
 
Box 7: Working principles for support to security sector reform 
i. Provide assistance in ways that enhance domestic ownership of reform processes and strengthen the 
institutional framework and human capacity for managing the security system in a manner consis tent 
with sound democratic governance practices and sound financial governance of the security system. 
ii. Recognise that needs, priorities and circumstances governing SSR differ substantially regionally as 
well as by country. This should be underpinned by the understanding - through appropriate analysis – 
of differing capacities, willingness and ownership to embrace SSR. 
iii. Make it a priority to help local stakeholders determine what will work best for them, maximising use of 
scarce resources, through confidence-building efforts and by finding ways to build incentives into their 
systems to promote change.  
iv. Work together in partner countries to ensure that the principles and objectives of SSR work are clear.  
v. Ensure that the principles behind donor support for SSR programmes are coherent and transparent 
through work by development actors with all other departments concerned to ensure this. 
vi. Develop country-specific SSR approaches against the background of an assessment (such as a national 
security system review) of the country’s security needs and the context for reform.  
vii. Encourage donor governments to develop workable multi-sectoral strategies and enhance the links 
between development and security policy within SSR frameworks for whole-of-government action.  
viii. Although local demand for change cannot be created by donors, they can support activities that: 
Ø Help to increase dialogue among members of the security forces, the wider security system, 
civil society organisations, and the general public. 
Ø Bring an appropriate mix of expertise to the dialogue. 
Ø Further integrate the security system into government planning and budgeting processes. 
Ø Support regional dialogue and confidence-building mechanisms.  
ix. Identify entry-points and develop methods of working through local actors. Donors should seek to 
build on on-going initiatives and to avoid imposing organisational structures and modes of operation 
on partner country governments. 
x. In countries where there is lack of government commitment and capacity is weak, prepare the political 
and policy terrain and support dialogue through civil society and regional networks.  
                                                 
31 Cf. OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation: Security System Reform and 
Governance: Policy and Good Practice, Paris: 12 November 2003 (DCD/DAC/CPDC (2003)4/REV3 (Draft 
document). 
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xi. Support civil society efforts to create a pro -reform environment of democratic governance, in 
particular where there are significant obstacles to achieving local ownership and active partner 
participation. 
xii. Assist in the development of more integrated development and security policies by encouraging   donor 
and partner governments to expand more traditional public sector management, public expenditure 
management, and anti-corruption activities into the security domain. 
xiii. Adopt a regional perspective even when assistance is provided in support of a national reform 
programme. Regional dynamics can have a major impact, positive or negative, on security systems. 
Needs and priorities governing SSR, such as incentives for reform, differ. Where feasible, 
development actors should work through or support regional or sub-regional organisations involved in 
security-related activities. 
 
From the draft Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, OECD DAC 
November 2003  
 
In this DAC document the security sector reform concept is primarily seen as a framework to 
structure thinking and how to address diverse security challenges. It elaborates on 
management and approach. It strongly calls for a “whole-of-government” approach. The 
evolving DAC policy and approach may, however, not sufficiently take account of a situation 
where most donors would prefer to take a more partial approach to these issues. Donor 
policies and activities would perhaps in most cases be classified as support for “good 
governance”, “democratisation”, “anti-corruption”, “civil society” and so on. Only in 
exceptional cases, involving reconstruction of collapsed states, may donor agencies pursue a 
comprehensive programme for assistance to the security sector. It is therefore important that 
policy guidelines in this area also provide lessons and recommendations on how these issues 
can be pursued in other sector programmes. This also applies to DAC policy guidelines in 
other areas. 
 
The current draft document does, however, provide a good summary of the relevant categories 
of security sector reform-related activities. They are reproduced in Box 8. It is a further 
development of the DFID entry points listed above (cf. Box 4). 
 
Box 8: Categories of reform activities in the security sector 
 
1. Political and Policy Dialogue and Initiatives:  Activities aimed at improving civil-security force 
relations, increasing civilian input into security policymaking, and preparing the terrain for reform.  
This can include confidence-building activities between civilians and security force personnel. 
2. Armed Forces and Intelligence: Activities aimed at improving governance of the armed forces, the 
intelligence services, paramilitary forces and other reserve or local defence units that support military 
functions, provide border security and so on. 
3. Justice and Internal Security Apparatus: Activities involving police functions, prisons, courts, secret 
services, and civilian internal intelligence agencies. 
4. Non-state Security Forces: Activities involving private security companies and other irregular 
security bodies which enjoy a degree of public authority and legitimacy that is not derived from the 
state itself or legal status: political party militias/security forces, local militias, bodyguard units, and 
so on. 
5. Civil Oversight Mechanisms: Activities involving formal mechanisms – such as the legislature, 
legislative select committees, auditors general, police commissions, human rights commissions – and 
informal mechanism – such as civil society “watchdog” organisations, and customary authorities. 
6. Civil Management Bodies: Activities aimed at strengthening functions for financial management, 
planning and execution; security policy development; personnel management and the like found in 
finance, defence, internal affairs and justice ministries, president/prime minister’s offices, national 
security advisory bodies and the like. 
7. Civilian Capacity Building: Activities aimed at general capacity building/education initiatives that do 
not fit into the civil management and oversight categories, including activities designed to build 
capacity of civil society groups seeking to analyse and influence security policy and increase public 
literacy on security issues, academic or other training courses on security issues. 
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8. Regional Initiatives: Activities involving the role of foreign affairs ministries/peacemaking 
initiatives, and formal mechanisms such as defence treaties/pacts, regional security bodies for dealing 
with defence, criminal, intelligence issues and the like. 
9. Initiatives to Demilitarise Society: Activities in the area of disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DD&R) of former combatants and efforts to tackle small arms and light weapons 
proliferation and similar efforts. 
 
From the draft Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice, OECD DAC 
 November 2003 
   
A recent study commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides 
additional guidelines on how donor agencies can assist in supporting democratic governance 
in the security sector.32 The study outlines an institutional assessment framework focusing on 
five entry points. One is the rule of law in relation to the security institutions. The second 
focuses on how the government develop and implement security policies. The third entry 
point is an assessment of the normative and technical professionalism of the security forces. 
The fourth is the accountability of the security sector and the quality of the oversight. The 
final entry point is the management of security expenditures. The Dutch study then goes on to 
provide recommendations on the procedures to be followed which may culminate with the 
adoption of a locally owned security governance strategy. 
 
The guidelines developed in the Dutch study basically apply standard institutional assessment 
criteria and guidelines and applies them to the security sector. As such it is a useful tool for 
donor agencies contemplating how to approach security reform issues, either as a stand-alone 
policy or as a component in other sector strategies. 
                                                 
32 Cf. N. Ball, T. Bouta & L. van de Goor, Enhancing Democratic Governance of the Security Sector: An 
Institutional Assessment Framework , The Hague: The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003 (Prepared 
by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”).  
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Norwegian Support to Security Sector Reform – an Overview 
 
Norway has firm and strong political commitment to peace building in developing countries. 
It sees peace as the main precondition for development.33  The Government considers external 
assistance to conflict resolution and peace building as very important. This may include 
assistance in getting the parties in the conflict to negotiate, but also assistance to the building 
of peace by addressing social and economic development as well as political and security 
issues.34 
 
Box 9: Norwegian support 
“External assistance (to peace-building) should include long-term plans and initiatives that promote 
reconciliation, good governance, democratic development and respect for human rights. Refugees and internally 
displaced persons must be repatriated and reintegrated. Civil society must be reconstructed. And we must not 
forget the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, humanitarian mine-related issues, 
getting small arms under control and security sector reform. Efforts to consolidate peace must also include long-
term measures to promote high-quality and accessible education, health services, and productive sector 
development.” 
Ms Hilde F. Johnson, Norway’s Minister of International Development, 2003 
  
 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., the Minister of International Development, Hilde F. Johnsen’s Statement to the Storting on 
Development Co-operation Policy 2002, The Storting, 30 April 2002, and the Government of Norway,  Fighting 
Poverty. Norway’s Action Plan 2015 for Combating Poverty in the South, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2002. 
34 See e.g. the January 2003 speech by the Norwegian Minister of International Development (note 1). The key 
documents are a draft strategy paper from the Foreign Ministry, Peace building and development – What can 
Norway do?  (Unpublished draft 17.09.02), and two regional papers: West Africa (with a focus on Sierra Leone, 
Guinea and Liberia). Elements of a Norwegian strategy for peace building  (unpublished 26.10.01) and Great 
Lakes. Strategy for Norwegian support for peace building  (Unpublished, September 2002). All these documents 
are in Norwegian. Cf. also the overview provided of Norwegian support to peacebuilding in W. Hauge, 
Norwegian peacebuilding policies: Lessons learnt and challenges ahead, Oslo: PRIO November 2003 
(Contribution to the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding , Commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs). Available from www.prio.no. 
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Norway has a high profile as conflict mediator and facilitator of dialogue in several major 
conflicts – Israel/Palestine, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Sudan and others. It has also played a role 
in facilitating and assisting co-ordination of development assistance to a number of post-
conflict reconstruction efforts, e.g., in Afghanistan and Palestine. 
 
The financial disbursements to the political and security dimensions of peace building 
activities from the development aid budget are also significant although precise figures are not 
available. In the bilateral assistance sector (which accounts for roughly half of Norway’s 
NOK 14 billion official development assistance in 2002) NOK 1.4 billion was allocated to 
peace, human rights and democracy and NOK 1.6 billion to humanitarian purposes. Both 
these categories contain significant funding to activities in support of peace building. The 
multilateral assistance sector also has major and significant components focusing on peace 
building, especially in relation to post-conflict countries. This includes support channelled 
through UN agencies such as the UNDP, but also support to a range of international NGOs 
active in this field. 
 
In 2002 a special budget line for “transitional assistance” was set up. The main purpose of this 
allocation is to fund assistance to countries and areas recovering from conflict and disasters. 
Spending on such “transitional assistance” amounted to NOK 345 million in 2002. 
Afghanistan was the main recipient (NOK 90 million) followed by DR Congo (53 million, 
including support to regional projects in the Great Lakes). Other recipients included countries 
such as Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. The majority of the allocations 
from this budget line has been channelled through the UN (mainly UNDP) and the World 
Bank – 76% in 2002. The remaining 24% was channelled through Norwegian and 
international NGOs. 
  
Policies on peace building 
 
Norway has no policy framework or document specifically on “security sector reform”. They 
are however, engaged in this debate within OECD’s Development Assistance Committee and 
its Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation. They also address several 
related issues in their policy documents on peace building and in several aid programmes and 
projects. The bulk of the aid disbursements are allocated to various efforts to strengthen 
operational capacities of certain institutions, especially the police and the legal system. There 
has also been a preference for channelling funds to this sector through the multilateral channel 
and to countries emerging out of violent conflicts. The most comprehensive support has been 
provided to the Balkans where support for a more comprehensive security sector reform also 
has been developed. Limited funds for such purposes have been allocated through the bilateral 
channel to Norway’s “normal” partner countries or for regional co-operation in the South. 
 
 
Box 10: Norway’s main priorities 
The major Norwegian 2002 action plan Fighting Poverty states  that Norway’s main contribution to peace and 
security in the South shall be to 
· Strengthen the capacity of the UN and other international organisations to co-ordinate conflict 
resolution and prevention; 
· Prevent the spread of small arms and anti-personnel mines; 
· Improve living conditions in vulnerable areas to reduce recruitment of poor people into armed 
conflicts, and focus on the poor in peace building and reconstruction; 
· Strengthen capacities for non-violent conflict management; 
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· Promote a co-ordinated, holistic approach to peace building and a coherent, effective structure 
for international co-operation; 
· Build regional perspectives into peace making and conflict resolution where this is relevant; 
· Integrate peace building with development strategies in areas that are in conflict or in a post-
conflict situation; and 
· Consolidate peace through humanitarian assistance and long-term assistance. 
 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has prepared a handbook or guidelines for Norwegian support 
to peace building (currently – mid-2003- in its final draft stage) Combined with specific 
strategy documents for Norwegian support to peace building in the Great Lakes and in West 
Africa and key speeches, this is the main reference document for a Norwegian policy and 
strategy (cf. note 34 above). NORAD has the operational and management responsibilities for 
most bilateral aid, including support to peace building, although significant funding also is 
channelled directly from the Foreign Ministry. NORAD has established an informal 
discussion group to assess and review experiences of support to peace building. A planned 
restructuring of the relations between NORAD and the Ministry will take effect from early 
2004. This is expected to have important implications for the management of future 
Norwegian support to peace-building. 
 
While Norway does not have any official operational guideline or strategy for support to 
security sector reform, they do support a range of activities and programmes in this area. 
Together with policy statements and the documents listed above patterns and trends in 
Norwegian support can be identified. 
 
Commitment to the UN and multilateralism 
 
One notable feature of the Norwegian position is the historically strong emphasis on the role 
of the UN and other multilateral organisations. This has long been a pillar of Norwegian 
foreign policy, but more recently it has been reinforced with the new emphasis on supporting 
peace and security in developing countries. The argument is frequently made that 
international co-ordination and co-operation assume special importance in peace building and 
post-conflict reconstruction. It is also argued that Norway does not have the capacity and 
competence to play a strong and direct role in many of the countries where such assistance is 
required. Therefore Norway would like international organisations to take the lead through 
their field operations. The 2000-2002 membership of the UN Security Council further 
reinforced the Norwegian focus on peace building.   
 
The emphasis on the multilateral institutions has been manifested in many ways. One is 
Norwegian political support and financial allocations to UN bodies and international 
organisations active in this field. This includes generous funding of a number of special funds 
and allocations managed by, e.g., the UNDP or the World Bank, for various peace building 
purposes, especially in countries and regions where there are no Norwegian field missions (as 
in the Great Lakes and in West Africa and for interventions in areas such as demobilisation 
and reintegration of ex-combatants) or where an international organisation is considered to 
have a strong comparative advantage (e.g., Guatemala). Another manifestation is the strong 
Norwegian involvement in a number of global issues such as the ban on the use of anti-
personnel mines, and the role of small arms and light weapons. Norway has also been a firm 
supporter of UN peace operations and a strong participant in debates on the effectiveness and 
reform of such UN operations. Finally, Norway has in its bilateral development policies 
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pursued policies and initiatives emanating from the multilateral arena. And it has used the 
multilateral channel in its bilateral assistance to peace building (through “multi-bilateral” 
assistance). 
 
Norway is also an active member of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and its 
Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, and is engaged with the policy 
debates there on peace building and security sector reform.  
 
Another notable and related trend is a strong Norwegian emphasis on regional approaches and 
regional institutions in the support for peace building. In many conflict zones, it is impossible 
to address security issues without also examining the wider regional implications. 
Furthermore, helping to foster regional co-operation can help ensure the success of nationally 
based reform programmes. In the Norwegian assistance, this is perhaps most evident in the 
support to the Great Lakes. Both in Burundi and in DR Congo, regional- led initiatives are 
supported. 
 
Recent years, particularly following 11 September 2001, has seen certain additional features 
of Norwegian foreign policy which by some is interpreted as a weakening of the commitment 
to multilateralism and the UN. Deployment of Norwegian military troops in Afghanistan and 
Iraq has been the main manifestation of this new trend to participate in military operations 
outside the UN. NATO’s “Out of Area” policy and Norwegian ties to the US may 
increasingly shape certain dimensions of the Norwegian policy related to peacebuilding.  
      
Norwegian military and police  
 
A second major feature of Norwegian engagement has been the use of the Norwegian military 
and police to deliver externa l assistance to crisis and post-conflict countries, especially related 
to the strengthening of the operational capacities of similar institutions in these countries. 
Focus for both groups have been participation in UN and other international peace operations 
(which is not discussed in this report), and in offering specialised training programmes related 
to peace operations. This has involved bringing people from developing countries to regular 
training courses in Norway, as well as the holding of “train-the-trainer” courses in the South. 
The training has been closely linked to the demands and needs of UN peace operations. The 
involvement of the military and police have, however, also in a few cases moved beyond this 
and included support to police reform and institutional restructur ing in crisis and post-conflict 
countries. This has mainly been in the Balkans but also in East-Timor and in Afghanistan. An 
early effort was participation by Norwegian police in the support (through the UN) to the 
police training institution in El Salvador following the 1992 peace accord. 
 
The military contribution revolves around the Norwegian Defence International Centre 
(NODEFIC), a small unit which runs training courses for personnel who wish to qualify for 
specialised positions in peace operations. This is part of the joint Nordic Coordinated 
Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) education programme where Norway 
is responsible for logistics and command, Finland for military observers, etc. Most 
participants in these courses are from the Nordic and European countries while 3-4 of the 30-
40 officers attending each course are from countries outside Europe.  
 
In addition, NODEFIC maintains a small pool of instructors that conduct “train-the-trainer” 
courses in developing countries. This is mainly at the request of the UN and its Department of 
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Peacekeeping Operations, but some requests come directly from the country concerned. The 
Norwegian specialised skills are mainly in logistics, but other areas – especially civil-military 
relations (CIMIC) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants 
(DD&R) are also covered. Consideration is also currently being given to the establishment of 
a Norwegian pool of instructors in DD&R. 
 
Military officers from conflict/post-conflict countries have also in a few cases been invited to 
Norway to be exposed to the Norwegian military and the role of the military in a democratic 
society. This was the case, e.g., during the peace process in Guatemala. Currently (2003) this 
also involves the military in Colombia. 
 
The police have similar functions. The Police Directorate has a small unit of three persons 
working on civilian police and deployment of Norwegian police personnel in peacekeeping 
operations. This is mainly through the UN, through the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, through the European Union and through bilateral agreements. At any 
one time a maximum of one percent of the Norwegian police – equivalent of about 80 people 
- can be deployed abroad on such missions. Currently (mid-2003) some 50 people are 
deployed. Most are deployed in the Balkans. Five officers are currently (mid-2003) part of 
UN missions in Africa (in Western Sahara and in Sierra Leone). 
 
Police selected for deployment attend a two-week preparatory course at the Police Academy. 
The Academy also offers a specialised course in human rights and law enforcement, and 
provides “train-the-trainer” courses in this topic. A pool of instructors in human rights and 
law enforcement has been established to provide similar courses in other countries. This has 
included post-conflict countries in Balkan, East Timor and – in 2003 - Afghanistan. 
 
In 2003 Norway began to broaden its support to also include other aspects of the justice sector 
(see the section on governance below).  
 
The single largest project involving instructors from both the Norwegian military and the 
police is Training for Peace in Southern Africa (TfP). It was started in the mid-1990s and the 
objective was to establish a self-sustaining, multifunctional peacekeeping capacity in the 
region (see more in the next chapter). 
 
There are no proper reviews or evaluations specifically of the relevance and impact of the use 
of Norwegian military and police officials in such operations. Studies of the activities in the 
early 1990s, suggest that the Norwegians may not have been sufficiently prepared, that they 
lacked important knowledge of local contexts, and that the relevance of the missions were at 
times unclear35. However, the impression is that there may have been significant 
improvements in the latter half of the 1990s. 
 
Civil society 
 
A third feature of the Norwegian policy is the strong role of Norwegian and international 
NGOs as channels and vehicles for disbursement of aid. This applies not only to “traditional” 
                                                 
35 This is a finding emerging from the assessment of the role of the Norwegian police in the peace accord in 
Mozambique. See Chr. Michelsen Institute in association with Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of 
Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 1997 (Evaluation Report 4.97).  
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development aid, but also to Norway’s assistance to peace building and post-conflict 
countries. Northern NGOs have been a particular important channel in countries and regions, 
such as the Great Lakes, where there is limited official Norwegian presence. They have been 
engaged in providing support to, e.g., conflict mediation, community development, 
repatriation of refugees and provision of humanitarian assistance. NGOs have also been 
important in some of the main international issues where Norway has a high profile, such as 
campaigns against the use of anti-personnel mines and control of small arms.  
 
Furthermore, Norway has used NGOs as vehicle to help strengthen civil society in post-
conflict countries.   
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also established a Norwegian Resource Bank for 
Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), managed by the Centre for Human Rights at the 
University of Oslo and the Norwegian Refugee Council. These institutions second personnel 
to UN missions, to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other 
organisations to promote human rights and democratisation. It has not focused specifically on 
security sector reform although it has worked in related and relevant fields, especially in the 
legal sector and in crime investigation. NORDEM may potentially be in a position to play a 
more important role in this field.36   
 
Research and policy development 
 
Norway has a relatively large research milieu providing input, policy advice and 
implementation assistance related to the security sector. This milieu is found in a range of 
research institutions and university departments. The five major ones are the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Centre for Human Rights (CHR), the Chr. 
Michelsen Institute (CMI), the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO) and the FAFO 
Institute for Applied International Studies (FAFO).  
 
NUPI has a Foreign Ministry-funded UN programme which involves several researchers 
working on different aspects of secur ity sector reform. Its strongest contribution may be in its 
policy related work regarding the role of the police in peace operations and justice sector 
reform. It also works closely with the Ministry of Justice and the Police Directorate on these 
issues. Close ties have also been established with the relevant UN agencies and an 
international network of scholars and practitioners, including UNDP, and related to justice 
and security sector reform. It is intimately involved in the assessments of peace building in 
the Balkans and also manages the Training for Peace in Southern Africa-project. 
 
CHR at the University of Oslo’s Law Faculty offers professional advice and training in 
international and human rights law. It advises the relevant Ministries and NORAD on policy 
issues and aid programmes related to human rights, international law and external assistance 
to legal sector reform. It also manages the NORDEM-project (see the civil society section 
above) and other operational programmes, and offers short-term training courses. 
 
CMI has a stronger focus on development and aid policy. It has provided policy advice and 
evaluations for a range of donors and international organisations on issues related to security 
                                                 
36 Cf. also T&B Consult, Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights 
(NORDEM), Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002 (Evaluation Report 1/2002).  
 37 
sector reform. They are focusing inter alia on donor policies, strategies for peace building and 
governance dimensions (including oversight, expenditure reviews and anti-corruption issues). 
They also have major research projects on aid in conflict, and on transitional justice. CMI’s 
work is combined with a strong knowledge of local conditions  in several geographical 
regions, especially related to Southern and Sub-Saharan African and Central/South Asia  
(including crisis and post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan and East Timor). 
 
PRIO has contributed less as policy advisors but has a particularly strong academic record on 
several of these issues, especially related to the causes of violent conflict and conflict 
management. It is also managing a range of community- level projects focusing on dialogue 
and has evaluated several projects related to conflict management and peacebuilding. 
 
FAFO has a Programme for International Co-operation and Conflict Resolution focusing on 
policies and practices of international responses to armed conflict. There is no direct focus on 
security sector reform with most projects focusing on the economics of conflict. 
Governance and the security sector 
 
Norway’s main contribution to security sector reform may have been in strengthening the 
capacity of selected aspects of security institutions in some, mainly crisis and post-conflict, 
countries and regions. Mostly this has been through the use of Norwegian military and police 
officers and instructor courses in peacekeeping (logistics, demobilisation and reintegration, 
human rights, civil-military relations, etc). There have also been some efforts to support 
national training institutions and police reform in crisis and post-conflict countries. In some 
countries this is now being expanded to focus on the broader issue of institutional reform in 
the justice sector. Furthermore, Norway has been an important supporter of international and 
regional organisations and their engagements in this area. 
 
Notably, there has been no systematic and focused attempt at addressing issues of governance 
and civilian oversight in direct Norwegian support to the security sector with the partial 
exception of the Balkans. Governance issues are otherwise an area where there are 
considerable lessons to be learnt from the extensive Norwegian support to democratisation 
and human rights, especially in the main Norwegian partner countries. This includes areas 
such as financial management and anti-corruption, human rights commissions and 
ombudsman institutions, the role of parliaments and public sector reform. The Norwegian 
efforts to support political democratisation processes through support for civil society, 
including media and research/advocacy institutions, are other examples of areas where 
Norwegian experiences may be highly relevant also to security sector reform. 
 
There is some support to the justice sector and legal reform in Norwegian bilateral assistance, 
but most support in this area has been channelled through multilateral institutions (such as 
UNDP’s work in Guatemala). This also includes the extensive Norwegian support for justice 
and reconciliation in post-conflict countries. In the bilateral assistance, the main focus in 
assistance to the legal sector has been on access to justice and community empowerment, and 
in support to infrastructure (mainly construction of court buildings). In 2003, the Norwegian 
Ministry of Justice established a small team of senior officials with a capacity to provide rapid 
advice on legislation, institutional reform and implementation in the justice sector. This 
civilian crisis management team is intended to become an important supplement to the 
assistance provided through the Police Directorate. Through these efforts, Norway intends to 
provide assistance to nearly all aspects of the justice sector. The assistance will mostly be 
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made available through the UN, OSCE and the European Union, and target crisis and post-
conflict countries and countries where reform of the justice sector is required.  
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Southern Africa and Security Sector Reform 
  
 
The countries of Southern Africa provide important lessons learnt for security sector reform. 
Many of the countries here are involved in peace building and in improving governance. 
Furthermore, there is  a relatively strong political commitment to increased regional co-
operation. For many countries it is also difficult to address security sector reform without 
regional support.  
 
Foreign aid donors have also been engaged in efforts to assist security sector reform. Some 
have also turned to regional institutions and have supported efforts to harmonise norms and 
standards for governance to ensure the success of nationally based security sector reform 
programmes in the region. Southern Africa has been the biggest recipient of Norwegian 
bilateral development assistance over the past 20 years. Norway has also been a firm 
supporter of regional co-operation. This chapter will briefly assess the experiences of security 
sector reform in Southern Africa and the role of Norwegian aid. 
  
Regional co-operation and the security sector 
 
Southern Africa entered the 1990s with a lot of optimism. Independence in Namibia, a 
comprehensive peace settlement in Mozambique, the end of apartheid and a wave of multi-
party elections promised a new era. Some countries in the region with South Africa as the 
prime example, also witnessed extensive reform of the security sector. Regional co-operation, 
now under the umbrella of Southern African Development Community (SADC), also placed 
peace, democracy and human rights issues at the centre stage. However, the achievements at 
the end of the 1990s were much less than expected. Some countries had consolidated their 
democracies, others saw a reversal into growing authoritarianism, and new threats to regional 
security emerged (such as small arms, transborder crime, population movements and the 
spread of HIV/AIDS). SADC was also becoming increasingly incapacitated due to, inter alia, 
growing political divisions between member countries. The conflict in the DR Congo and 
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later in Zimbabwe, in particular, had a strong impact on SADC’s ability to deal with issues of 
governance, peace and security issues.37 
 
The new millennium saw some positive developments. Peace settlements in war-torn Angola 
and the DR Congo signalled a new development with major regional implications. Efforts 
were also made to revive SADC through a major organisational restructuring, including a 
stronger Secretariat. Of particular importance for the discussion in this report, was the 2001 
adoption by SADC of a protocol providing guidelines for how the organisation should engage 
politics, security and defence issues. This SADC protocol also provided the outline of a 
revived SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. This Organ established 
a number of institutional structures. The Organ is chaired on a Troika basis by three SADC 
countries (in a model similar to the OSCE-structures); it has two ministerial committees under 
it. One is an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (led by SADC’s Defence, Public 
and State Security Ministers). This is an old committee (its roots are in the Frontline States of 
the 1970s) and it has a large number of functional subcommittees and structures (most notably 
in policing). The second ministerial committee is the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy 
Committee. This committee is new. It brings together Foreign Ministers and deals with issues 
involving governance, conflict management and other matters. 
 
SADC is making some progress at the policy level in addressing security and governance 
issues. A strategic plan for the SADC Organ was approved at the Summit in August 2003. It 
outlines a number of principles to facilitate good governance, security sector reform and 
confidence building among member countries. A Mutual Defence Pact was signed at the same 
summit. In a few areas SADC is also making some progress at the level of implementation, 
especially in policing related to organised crime and other areas (small arms), but also in 
assisting peace building in some member countries (the DR Congo and Lesotho). 
 
However, and despite some progress, the operationalisation and implementation of the  
emerging SADC policies are lagging far behind. In some areas the gap between policies and 
implementation is widening. SADC’s inability to appropriately respond to the growing crisis 
in Zimbabwe has further reinforced a perception of SADC as both unwilling and unable to 
address such issues. SADC has difficulties in responding to these challenges. This appears to 
be so partly because SADC does not have any mechanisms or procedures to intervene when 
members fail to adhere to adopted policies and principles. And partly because certain member 
countries do not wish to give SADC the authority and powers required. Finally, and most 
importantly: there is also insufficient agreement and lack of consensus between member 
countries on how to approach and pursue governance and security issues.  
 
It is therefore expected that we will see a slow and tortuous evolvement of SADC’s security 
and governance policies. One may also expect that the evolving regional security architecture 
will be designed primarily to protect states and ruling elites and pay less attention to human 
security concerns.38 On the other hand: there is also a growth of associated SADC structures – 
such as the Parliamentary Forum, the Election Commissioners Forum, and the regional 
organisation of the Police – which are developing common policies and guidelines which will 
                                                 
37 See more on this in J. Isaksen & E. N. Tjønneland: Assessing the Restructuring of SADC – Positions, Policies 
and Progress, Bergen: CMI 2001 (Report R2001: 6).  
38 This is argued in A. Hammerstad, Defending the State or Protecting the People? SADC Security Integration at 
a Crossroads?, Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, November 2003 (SAIIA Report Nr 
39). 
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also positively impact on SADC itself and its efforts to develop common and harmonised 
policies in this field.  
 
The most dynamic development at the inter governmental level with a potential strong impact 
on evolving SADC policies on peace and security is emerging out  of pan-African initiatives 
associated with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African 
Union. While NEPAD’s peer review mechanism may provide an important platform for 
interventions in domestic affairs the focus of the peer review is  increasingly expected to be on 
economic governance issues. It has been left to the new African Union’s Peace and Security 
Council to develop policy guidelines in the security and political governance field.39 These 
are currently being drafted and are expected to provide an important framework for future 
engagement with security sector reform and peace building. 
 
Some countries in the region have implemented far-reaching reforms of the security sector 
and facilitated civilian oversight and democratic governance. Civil society and non-security 
actors have played a very important role in this process.40 The chief example is the end of 
apartheid and transformation of the security sector in South Africa. This has provided an 
important impetus for reform of the security sector also in other countries in the region. (See 
box 11). 
 
Box 11: Civil society and security sector reform 
 
A NGO-based Military Resource Group was established in South Africa in 1993. It was an important think-tank 
behind the reform of the security sector after the end of apartheid in 1994. It was later established as the 
Defence and Management Programme at the University of the Witwatersrand and developed innovative training 
programmes for senior security officials on civilian oversight and democratic governance. It later established a 
regional network – the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) – which has 
project units in six other SADC countries. External funding has been provided by Denmark with additional 
project funding from DFID and Canada 
Source: www.sadsem.net 
    
 
Norwegian support 
 
Norway has been a firm and financial supporter of regional co-operation and SADC since its 
establishment in 1980. A special Nordic-SADCC Initiative was established in the mid-1980s 
to provide a framework for an expanded economic co-operation as well as political dialogue 
between the two regions. This co-operation began to falter in the 1990s, and the Initiative was 
formally dissolved in 1995. While Norway continued to provide funding for specific regional 
co-operation activities, direct communication between Norway and the SADC Secretariat had 
almost ended by the late 1990s. Eventually Norway through NORAD adopted a new regional 
strategy in early 2001 as a response to changing regional dynamics and new challenges. These 
guidelines emphasised that support to peace, human rights and democracy should be a priority 
                                                 
39 See African Union: Report of the Meeting of Experts on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, 27-
29 March 2003, Randburg, South Africa. Cf. also the Institute for Security Studies, Conference Report: Regional 
Conference: Integrating the Security Sector Transformation Challenges of SADC into the NEPAD Agenda, 
Military Academy, Saldanha: South Africa, 20-22 May 2002. The homepage of the Institute of Security Studies 
in Pretoria is particularly informative on evolving AU policies. See www.iss.co.za.  
40 More data and assessment of security sector reform in individual SADC countries can be found in Cawthra & 
Luckham (eds.) 2003 and in R. Williams, G. Cawthra & D. Abrahams (eds.), Ourselves to Know. Civil-Military 
Relations and Defence Transformation in Southern Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies 2003. 
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area for Norwegian support to regional co-operation in Southern Africa. Norway also became 
the main donor behind SADC’s process of institutional restructuring. 
 
Norway has not engaged directly with the new SADC Organ and the efforts to fo rmulate and 
implement new polices in this area. Norway has however, provided some direct funding for 
the new NEPAD initiative and has taken a strong interest in pan-African initiatives. Norway 
has also supported a few regional and national projects and programmes related to security 
sector issues. It has also provided funding through a variety of multilateral channels to assist 
peace building and security sector issues in the region. 
 
Currently, the chief regional project supported is Training for Peace in Southern Africa. This 
project seeks to provide training and build capacity in Southern Africa for participation in 
peace operations, with a recent strong focus on policing. The project does not engage directly 
with regional institutions, except for some small, but important past linkages to the SADC 
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs 
Organisation (both based in Harare and both nominally falling under the SADC Organ). The 
project’s formal links to these organisations came to an end with the deteriorating political 
situation in Zimbabwe, although there are still important informal links to the regional police 
organisation. 
 
Working through the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and two South African 
NGOs (Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)) a number of training courses were held in Southern 
Africa with instructors from NODEFIC and the Police Academy. Officers from Southern 
Africa also attended courses in Norway. In addition, the project made influential inputs in the 
South African debate on peacekeeping, and contributed to the government’s policy 
formulation. In the current second phase, the emphasis has shifted from the military to the 
police and civil-military relations. 
 
Box 12: Training for Peace 
 
Training for Peace in Southern Africa (TfP) is the main example of a Norwegian-initiated effort to pursue 
security sector reform in Norway’s “normal” partner countries in the South. TfP began in the mid-1990s with 
the objective of assisting in establishing a self-sustaining, multifunctional peacekeeping capacity in the region. 
In addition, the project made influential inputs in the South African debate about peacekeeping and contributed 
to the South African government’s policy formulation. In the current second phase, the emphasis has shifted 
from the military to the police and civil-military relations. The project is implemented through the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs and two South African NGOs (Institute for Security Studies and African Centre  
for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes). A number of training courses have been held in Southern Africa 
with instructors from the Defence International Centre and the Police Academy in Norway. The project has 
established its own website - www.trainingforpeace.org  
 
The Norwegian instructors mainly focused on delivering “mainstream” UN type training and 
capacity building. Under the auspices of the South African partners, some efforts have, 
however, also been made to extract lessons learnt from the myriad of peacekeeping operations 
in the region which in turn could assist in doctrinal development of peace operations and 
peace enforcement in Africa.41 
                                                 
41 See more on this in M. Malan: “Towards more effective peace operations: Learning from the African 
“laboratory”?”, pp. 100-128 in R. Thakur & A. Schnabel (eds.) op.cit. Additional information and assessments of 
TfP were made in a recent joint Norwegian/South African review, P. Pillay & E. N. Tjønneland, From Aid to 
Partnership – A Joint Review of Norwegian – South African Development Co-operation 1995-2001 , Bergen: 
CMI 2003 (CMI Report R2003:1) (available from www.cmi.no)   
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At the bilateral level, a number of activities are supported, both directly and through 
multilateral institutions. There has been extensive support to clearing of anti-personnel mines 
in Angola and Mozambique (mainly channelled through a Norwegian NGO) and support to 
projects against small arms (mainly through South African NGOs and an ad hoc grant to a 
destruction of small arms-project run by the police in South Africa). These projects were 
important also in light of Norway’s strong international profile in the campaign against anti-
personnel mines and small arms. 
 
Norway has also provided an ad hoc financial grant  to South Africa’s Department of Defence 
as a contribution to South Africa’s peace support mission in Burundi. There has also been 
some limited contact between military officials in Norway and South Africa, mainly in 
relation to the UN and other multilateral issues. 
 
There has been some Norwegian support to policing. This has mainly revolved around (in 
addition to policing as part of peace support missions) support for applied research on how to 
combat transborder and organised crime (through South Africa private institutions) and 
community policing (through NGOs and research institutions in South Africa and Malawi).  
 
There has been significant support to the legal sector in several SADC countries. This support 
has mainly been confined to efforts to improve access to justice as well as support to public 
and private watchdog bodies such as ombudsman, human rights institutions and NGOs. 
Support has also been provided to applied research on transitional justice in post-conflict 
reconstruction (mainly through NGOs and research institutions in South Africa). 
 
Norway has also provided support – mainly channelled through multilateral institutions – to 
peace settlements and reconstruction. This included Namibia and Mozambique in the early 
1990s. Currently support is provided to peace building in Angola and the DR Congo. In the 
DR Congo this includes support to the UNDP, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the UN’s peace 
support mission (including – also through the World Bank – support for demobilisation and 
reintegration), humanitarian assistance through the UN and NGOs, and (through Norwegian 
NGOs) support for peace and reconciliation at the community level. In Angola much of the 
funds for peace building are channelled through the UNDP. 
 
Direct support for governance issues related to the security sector has, however, been limited. 
Lessons from the general Norwegian bilateral support to democratisation and good 
governance are however, highly relevant for a possible future support to the security sector. 
There is substantial Norwegian support in many SADC countries to strengthen parliaments, 
public watchdog committees, the media, and public financial management and anti-corruption 
bodies. There is also a general support for the promotion of human rights and international 
law. All of these are highly relevant in any effort to develop future support for good 
governance related to the security sector. 
 
 44 
 45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What should Norway do? 
 
What are the implications for future Norwegian support to security sector reform? The above 
review of the global experiences tells us that although there are many examples of external 
assistance to security sector reform in the 1990s, there are few evaluations and limited 
reflections of this support. The donor engagement has also been varied – response to local 
initiatives, part of a good governance agenda, or linked to a post-conflict reconstruction 
agenda. The entry points and priorities for donors frequently depend on the department or 
office (defence, foreign affairs, police, development aid) responsible and on the geographical 
location of the country concerned. The defence and security establishments in the Northern 
countries have often other perspectives, views and experiences compared to donor agencies. 
Furthermore, the “war on terrorism” agenda poses new challenges for reform of the security 
sector.  
 
These weaknesses in the conception and implementation of the international support to 
security sector reform should, however, not detract from its many strengths. The current 
concern with security sector reform is a significant evolution from earlier and Cold War 
approaches to military aid. It provides an important framework for structure thinking around 
the relation between security and development, more specifically the relations between 
security institutions and governance. It is now increasingly recognised that peace building and 
security not only depends on effective security institutions; the institutions also need to be 
governed in a legitimate way.  
 
Norway in its foreign policy and development aid policy rarely uses the term “security sector 
reform”, although they do provide support for a number of activities in this area, probably 
with the Norwegian assistance to the Balkans as the most comprehensive. This report 
concludes that Norway should continue to play a role and to provide financial and technical 
assistance to reform of the security sector both as part of the support for peace building in 
post-conflict countries, and in co-operation with new and consolidating democracies among 
its partner countries in the South. In most cases this would probably imply that Norway 
should focus on a component of the security sector (e.g. policing and judicial reform), either 
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as part of a comprehensive international support for security sector reform to a particular 
country or region, or as part of Norwegian bilateral support for democratisation and good 
governance.  
 
The report does not call for major changes and new policies, but suggests that the focus 
should be sharpened to improve effectiveness and efficiency of the Norwegian assistance. 
This may involve a number of issues. 
 
First, Norway should develop a policy document and guidelines for its assistance to peace 
building and the role of the security sector. This could also serve as a handbook and help 
facilitate an understanding of how the diverse security challenges can be addressed through an 
integration of development and security policies focusing on the security institutions 
themselves. This can most easily be achieved through a finalisation of the Foreign Ministry’s 
current draft document on “Peace building and development. What can Norway do?” This 
will also be of help for staff on the ground involved in developing and implementing 
programmes and projects. Such guidelines will also help ensure an improvement in the 
linkages between projects and activities supported and their impact on peacebuilding and 
security sector reform.   Such guidelines will also help facilitate co-ordination between the 
many different actors and stakeholders on the Norwegian side. The policy discussion with the 
OECD/DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on security sector 
reform provides important guidelines as well as a platform for donor co-operation. 
 
Secondly, the importance given to multilateral and regional organisations must be maintained. 
This includes support to a strengthening of the institutional capacity of the UN and regional 
organisations to engage with security sector reform. In the African context, this also implies a 
strong capacity to monitor and respond to efforts made by pan-African (African Union, 
Nepad) and sub-regional (e.g., SADC) institutions to pursue governance and security sector 
reform. These channels assume an added importance in relation to countries emerging out of 
violent conflicts. 
 
Thirdly, Norway should, in its bilateral assistance, consider assistance to the governance and 
oversight dimension of security sector reform. To achieve this, it will be important to identify 
areas where Norway has comparative advantages. This includes competence and knowledge 
of local context  and support to political processes facilitating an environment enabling reform 
of the security sector. Such assistance is mainly relevant where Norway has extensive 
ongoing bilateral co-operation. 
 
Norway provides extensive bilateral development assistance to governance dimensions in 
several of its main partner countries. This assistance provides many lessons learnt of high 
relevance also for future support to improved governance in the security sector. The main 
examples of such relevant Norwegian assistance are the support to financial management 
(including also anti-corruption and combat of organised crime); human rights bodies and 
ombudsman institutions; parliamentary oversight; and civil society (including media and 
research institutions).  Many of these are also highly relevant entry points to facilitate political 
dialogue on security sector reform. 
 
Such Norwegian support for the security sector should be integrated in current development 
strategies, including, where appropriate, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) -
process. The PRSP is a relatively new mechanism to facilitate a national consensus and 
ownership of development priorities with the overall objective of reducing poverty. Spending 
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on security and the role of the security institutions are crucial issues in this process, but they 
have so far hardly been addressed. Governments have often been reluctant to include such 
issues in the PRSP forum and donors have generally not pressed for it. This is however, now 
beginning to change in several countries, especially as a result of civil society interventions.    
 
Fourthly, Norway should continue and further strengthen the role of Norwegian military and 
police officers in delivering Norwegian assistance to a strengthening of the operational 
capacities of the security sector. Their competence is, however, technical and limited to 
certain niches. Strengthening operational capacities, and the need to improve physical security 
in many both post-conflict and “normal” developing countries, are very important, but it is 
also crucial to approach this from a governance perspective. Support for training programmes 
and other projects have limited impact unless it is linked to wider reform of the security 
sector. Current Norwegian efforts to focus also on other institutional aspects of the justice 
sector (prosecution, courts, and the penal system) are an important move in this direction. 
 
Fifthly, a regional approach should where possible be pursued in Norwegian support for 
security sector reform. In many cases it is impossible to address security sector reform issues 
without also examining the wider regional dimensions. Regional co-operation may also help 
ensure the success of nationally based security sector programmes. Lessons from current 
Norwegian regional support to security sector reform in the Balkans are important. 
 
Finally, the management of the security sector reform is particularly demanding and 
challenging. It is currently channelled from a variety of offices in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, from NORAD, from the Ministries of Defence and Justice, and from various  research 
institutions and NGOs. It is important that an institutional model is found which enables these 
various milieus as well as the expertise at research institutions, to meet, exchange and share 
information and experiences. Furthermore, it is important that NORAD becomes more 
strongly involved in this field because of their professional skills in assessing programmes 
and projects in related governance issues. 
 
Box 13: Recommendations 
Norway should continue to provide development assistance addressing the security challenges. The focus 
should be sharpened to improve effectiveness and efficiency. This includes  
· Finalising a policy document on peace building which includes approaches to security sector reform. 
This involves continued engagement with the policy discussion within the OECD Development  
Assistance Committee; 
· Continuing to use multilateral and regional organisations as channels for delivering support to reform 
of the security sector;  
· Developing skills and programmes in delivering bilateral assistance to civilian democratic governance 
of the security sector in Norway’s partner countries; 
· Using the Norwegian military and police as channels for delivering niche products in strengthening 
operational capacities of institutions in the security sector, but broaden the policing focus to include 
also other dimensions of the justice sector; 
· Applying a regional approach and regional support channels to assist security sector reform in 
individual countries; and 
· Improving co-ordination and information-sharing between the different Norwegian government 
departments and stakeholders involved in security sector reform   
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Summary 
 
Security sector reform addresses two main challenges: (1) 
assisting institutions capable of providing security for the state 
and its citizens and (2) ensuring appropriate governance of 
these institutions in accordance with the principles of 
democracy and civilian oversight. 
This report is based on a study prepared as an input in 
a policy debate on the role of security sector reform in 
Norwegian assistance to peace building in developing 
countries. The report reviews the evolution of thinking around 
external assistance to security sector reform, and discusses the 
policies and programmes of the main donor agencies. The 
report also provides an overview of Norwegian support to 
security sector reform. This is followed by a case study of 
Southern Africa. The final section provides suggestions and 
recommendations for the future role of security sector reform 
in Norwegian support to peace building and development. 
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